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The Doctrine of Inevitable Discovery: A 
Plea for Reasonable Limitations 
Steven P. Grossman* 
I. Introduction 
In reinstating the Iowa murder conviction of Robert Williams, 
the Supreme Court accepted explicitly for the first time the doctrine 
of inevitable discovery. Applied for some time by state1 and federal 
courts,2 the doctrine of inevitable discovery is a means by which evi-
dence obtained illegally can still be admitted against defendants in 
criminal cases. Unfortunately, the Court chose to adopt the doctrine 
without any of the safeguards necessary to insure that the deterrent 
• The author, a former prosecutor in New York City, is currently Professor of Law, 
University of Baltimore Law School. B.A. City College of New York 1969, J.D. Brooklyn Law 
School 1973, LL.M. New York University Law School 1977. 
I. See. e.g., State v. Washington, 120 Ariz. 229, 231, 585 P.2d 249, 251 (Ct. App. 
1978) (reciting but not applying inevitable discovery); State v. Tillery, I 07 Ariz. 34, 39, 481 
P.2d 271,276 (1971) (en bane). cert. denied, 404 U.S. 847 (1971); People v. Emanuel, 87 Cal. 
App. 3d 205, 214, 151 Cal. Rptr. 44, 50 ( 1978); Lockridge v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. App. 3d 
166, 170, 474 P.2d 683, 686, 89 Cal. Rptr. 731, 734 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 910 
(1971); Sheff v. State, 301 So.2d 13, 18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974), a.ffd on other grounds, 
329 So.2d 270 (1976); People v. Pearson, 67 Ill. App. 3d 300,308-10,384 N.E.2d 1331, 1337-
38 (1978); People v. Moore, 55 Ill. App. 3d 706,711-12,371 N.E.2d 194, 197-98 (1977), affd 
on other grounds, 61 Ill. App. 3d 694, 378 N.E.2d 5•6 (1978); Leuschner v. State, 41 Md. 
App. 423, 428, 397 A.2d 622, 626 ( 1979); People v. Tucker, 19 Mich. App. 320, 328-30, 172 
N.W.2d 712, 717-18 (1969), affd, 385 Mich. 594, 189 N.W.2d 290 (1971), acq. in result, 
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 313-14, 380 
N.E.2d 224,230-31,408 N.Y.S.2d 395,401-02 (1978),/orma pauperis granted and probable 
jurisdiction noted, 439 U.S. 1044 ( 1978); People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 506-08, 300 
N.E.2d 139, 141-42, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973); State v. McKendall, 36 Or. App. 
187, 192, 584 P.2d 316, 320 ( 1978) (applying inevitable discovery test codified in OR. REv. 
STAT. § 133.683 ( 1977); Commonwealth v. Wideman, 478 Pa. 102, 105, 385 A.2d 1334, 1336 
(1978); Ex parte Parker, 485 S.W.2d 585, 589 (Tex. Crim. 1972). See also, People v. Kusow-
ski, 403 Mich. 653, 662, 272 N.W.2d 503, 506 ( 1978) (separate opinion); Annotation, Fruit of 
the Poisonous Tree Doctrine Excluding Evidence Dervied from Information Gained in Jllegal 
Search, 43 A.L.R.3d 385, 404-06 (1972); cf State v. Sickels, 275 N.W.2d 809, 814 (Minn. 
1979). 
2. United States v. Fisher, 700 F.2d 780, 784 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Apker, 
705 F.2d 293, 306-07 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699, 704 (lOth Cir. 
1982); United States v. Roper, 681 F.2d 1354, 1358 (lith Cir. 1982); Papp v. Jago, 656 F.2d 
221, 222 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bienvenue, 632 F.2d 910, 914 (1st Cir. 1980); 
United States v. Brooking, 614 F.2d 1037, 1042-44 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Schmidt, 
573 F.2d 1065-66, n.9 (9th Cir. 1978); Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914, 
927-28 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 ( 1975); United States ex rei Owens v. 
Twomey, 508 F.2d 858, 865-66 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Seohnlein, 423 F.2d 1051, 
1053 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 913 (1970); Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 
205, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1963). 
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impact of the exclusionary rule would be preserved, and in a form 
that is subject to and almost invites abuse. 
This article warns of the danger to fundamental constitutional 
protections posed by the open-ended approach taken by the Supreme 
Court to the doctrine of inevitable discovery in Nix v. Williams 
(Williams 1/).8 It then recommends a means of applying the doc-
trine so as to accomplish its purpose of avoiding unwarranted exclu-
sion of probative evidence without significantly diluting the impact 
of the exclusionary rule. 
II. Brewer v. Williams• 
The disappearance of ten-year old Pamela Powers from the 
YMCA building in Des Moines, Iowa on Christmas Eve, 1968 set 
off a chain of events which culminated in two major and highly con-
troversial Supreme Court decisions separated in time by seven years. 
In order to comprehend the rationale and approach of the Supreme 
Court to the doctrine of inevitable discovery, it is first necessary to 
summarize the known facts surrounding the death of Pamela 
Powers. 
A short time after Pamela Powers' disappearance, Robert Wil-
liams, an escaped mental patient residing at the YMCA, asked a 14 
year old boy to help him load a large bundle wrapped in a blanket 
into his car. The boy later reported that extending from the bundle 
he had seen two legs that were "skinny and white." The next day 
Robert Williams' car was located in Davenport, a city 160 miles east 
of Des Moines. Shortly thereafter, articles of clothing which the po-
lice believed belonged to Pamela Powers and an army blanket, simi-
lar in appearance to the one used to wrap the bundle Williams had 
removed from the YMCA, were found at a rest stop on Interstate 
80, approximately 60 miles east of Des Moines. These facts Jed po-
lice to suspect that Williams had murdered the Powers girl and dis-
posed of her body somewhere between Des Moines and and the rest 
stop where the articles of clothing and the blanket were found. The 
police then obtained an arrest warrant for Robert Williams and be-
gan a large scale search for the child's body in the vicinity of the rest 
stop.11 
On December 26th, while this search was underway, Williams, 
after speaking with an attorney, surrendered himself to the police in 
3. 467 u.s. 431 (1984). 
4. 430 U.S. 387 ( 1977) (hereinafter Williams f). 
5. 467 U.S. at 434-35. 
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Davenport. He was given his Miranda rights, charged with murder 
and arraigned before a judge. Arrangements were then made to 
transport Williams, accompanied by two detectives, back to Des 
Moines by car. An agreement was reached between the police and 
Williams' attorneys that no questioning of Williams would occur 
during the ride. Both Williams and Detective Learning, who was to 
accompany him, were made aware of this agreement.6 On the car 
ride back to Des Moines, however, Detective Learning delivered the 
now famous "Christian burial speech" to Williams, in which he told 
Williams of the need to locate the child's body before the Iowa win-
ter snows covered it up and prevented the girl from getting a proper 
Christian burial.7 After some more discussion between the two, Wil-
liams eventually led Learning to the site of the child's body. 
Based largely on the above facts, Williams was convicted of 
murder in the first degree for the death of Pamela Powers. After his 
appeal was rejected by the Iowa Supreme Court,8 Williams sought 
Habeas Corpus relief in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of lowa.9 The District Court reversed his convic-
tion, and this decision was affirmed by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,l0 The United States Supreme Court 
affirmed the Eighth Circuit and ordered that Williams be retried 
(Williams /).U The Court found that the statement that Detective 
Learning had obtained from Williams during the ride from Daven-
port to Des Moines violated Williams' right to counsel under the 
sixth amendment. Because Williams had been arraigned, the formal 
judicial process had already commenced, and he was fully protected 
by the sixth amendment. The Court determined that the speech 
Learning made to Williams was a deliberate elicitation of informa-
tion from Williams and therefore a violation of Williams' right to 
6. /d. at 435-36. 
7. Detective Learning reportedly said the following to Williams: 
I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling down the 
road . . . They are predicting several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel that 
you yourself are the only person that knows where this little girl's body is ... 
and if you get a snow on top of it you yourself may be unable to find it. And 
since we will be going right past the area [where the body is] on the way into 
Des Moines, I feel that we could stop and locate the body, that the parents of 
this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who was 
snatched away from them on Christmas [E]ve and murdered .... 
Jd. at 435. 
8. State v. Williams, 182 N.W.2d 396 (Iowa 1970). 
9. Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170 (S.D. Iowa 1974). 
10. Brewer v. Williams, 509 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1974). 
II. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (Williams/). 
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counseP2 under the holding in Massiah v. United States. 13 
Readers of this opinion could not help but be drawn to two 
other parts of the Supreme Court's decision. One was a particularly 
bitter dissent by the Chief Justice beginning with: "The result in this 
case ought to be intolerable in any society which purports to call 
itself an organized society."a It was this same Chief Justice who 
would later author the opinion in Williams II that, in the end, 
avoided this "intolerable result" by applying the doctrine of inevita-
ble discovery. The second item of note in Williams I, not related 
directly to the sixth amendment issue at hand, was the hint con-
tained in the footnote at the conclusion of the Court's opinion given 
to those who would ultimately determine the judicial fate of Robert 
Williams: 
[W]hile neither Williams' incriminating statements themselves 
nor any testimony describing his having led the police to the 
victim's body can constitutionally be admitted into evidence, evi-
dence of where the body was found and of its condition might 
well be admissible on the theory that the body would have been 
discovered in any event, even had incriminating statements not 
been cited from Williams. a 
It was in fact the doctrine of inevitable discovery, alluded to in this 
footnote, which became the vehicle through which evidence obtained 
from the victim's body was admitted against Williams in his second 
trial. 
III. Fruits of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine 
In order to assess the worthiness of the doctrine of inevitable 
discovery and to understand the parameters within which it should 
operate, the doctrine needs to be analyzed in its proper context. Such 
an analysis necessarily includes a discussion of the purposes of the 
Exclusionary Rule, the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine and the 
exceptions to this doctrine, among which is the doctrine of inevitable 
discovery. 
The rule which excludes illegally obtained evidence from use by 
the prosecution in a criminal case has traditionally been justified in 
two ways. First, it is argued that the use of evidence obtained in 
12. /d. at 399. Additionally, the Court ruled that although Williams may have under-
stood his right to counsel, the state was unable to demonstrate that he relinquished that right. 
/d. at 404-05. 
13. 377 u.s. 201 (1964). 
14. 430 U.S. at 415 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
15. /d. at 407 n.l2. 
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violation of the law by courts charged with enforcing that law would 
threaten the integrity of the judicial system itself. 16 This concept, 
known as the principle of judicial integrity, has been viewed with 
increasing disfavor by the Supreme Court in recent years. 17 Instead, 
it is the purported deterrent impact upon the police produced by sup-
pressing illegally obtained evidence that is cited most often today as 
the justification of the exclusionary rule. 18 This deterrent impact is 
intended not only for the offending officer, but for all officers who in 
the future might consider engaging in the same improper conduct,l9 
Bearing in mind that deterrence is currently perceived to be the pri-
mary justification behind the exclusionary rule, it is important now 
to assess the extent to which the exclusionary rule is applied. 
The exclusionary rule has been applied by the Supreme Court 
to what has been called secondary or derivative evidence as well as 
primary evidence.20 This means that whether the illegal conduct of 
the police officer leads directly or indirectly to the discovery of evi-
dence, that evidence will be suppressed providing there is a causal 
link between the original illegality and the evidence sought to be 
used.21 For example: A is illegally arrested, confesses following this 
16. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 ( 1960). After noting "the imperative of 
judicial integrity" which emerged from Elkins, the Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 
( 1961 ), wrote: "The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing 
can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its 
disregard of the charter of its own existence." ld. at 659. 
17. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,446 (1976) (wherein the Court, quoting in 
part from United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 ( 1974) states: "The Court, however, 
has established that the 'prime purpose' of the rule, if not the sole one, is to deter future 
unlawful police conduct." See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 ( 1976), wherein the Court 
went even further in minimizing the significance of the principle of judicial integrity: "While 
courts of course, must ever be concerned with preserving the integrity of the judicial process, 
this concern has a limited force as a justification for the exclusion of highly probative evi-
dence." /d. at 485. 
18. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. at 
446: Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 486; United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347. 
19. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 446; Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 484; Oaks, 
Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 710 (1970). 
That the exclusionary rule looks to future police misconduct was explained by the Court in 
Elkins v. U.S., 364 U.S. 206 ( 1960). The Elkins Court emphasized that: "The rule is calcu-
lated to prevent not to repair. Its purpose is to deter- to compel respect for the constitutional 
guaranty in the only effective available way - by removing the incentive to disregard it." /d. 
at 217. See a/so, 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 653-54 (1978) [hereinafter LaFave]; 
Schlag, Assaults on the Exclusionary Rule, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 875, 882 ( 1982); 
Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the 50 States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 355 ( 1962). 
20. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471 (1963); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. 
United States, 251 U.S. 385 ( 1920). 
21. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484; Nardone, 308 U.S. at 340; Silverthorne, 251 U.S. 
at 392; LaCount & Girese, The Inevitable Discovery Rule: An Evolving Exception to the 
Constitutional Exclusionary Rule, 40 ALB. L. REv. 483, 506-09 ( 1976). See generally 3 
LAFAVE, supra note 19, § 11.4, at 612. The reason for the application of the exclusionary rule 
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illegal arrest and implicates B as the source of his narcotics. If the 
police enter B's house, seize the narcotics and ultimately use them in 
a prosecution against A, the narcotics will be suppressed due to the 
fact that their discovery stems from the original illegality committed 
against A. Such derivative or secondary evidence has been called the 
"fruit of the poisonous tree."22 The exclusion of such illegally ob-
tained or derivative evidence will result whether the evidence stems 
from an illegal search or seizure under the fourth amendment23 or a 
statement taken in violation of the defendant's right under either the 
fifth or sixth amendment.24 
Because the exclusionary rule operates to prevent the prosecu-
tion from using probative evidence against defendants in criminal 
cases, and the perception among many that guilty people often go 
free because of this exclusion,211 the exclusionary rule has been the 
subject of much criticism.26 In an effort to ameliorate both the ac-
tual and the perceived impact of the exclusionary rule, the Supreme 
Court has limited its application. Specifically, where the Court has 
determined that the deterrent impact upon the police of applying the 
exclusionary rule in a specific situation is minimal, the Court has 
been reluctant to apply the rule.27 When the evidence at issue is de-
to secondary as well as primary evidence is that, "to forbid the direct use of methods ... but 
to put no curb on their full indirect use would only invite the very methods deemed 'inconsis-
tent with ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty'" Nardone, 308 U.S. at 340. 
22. Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341. This "hypothetical" is actually borrowed from the facts 
of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
23. /d. See also, Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 ( 1975). 
24. See 4 LAFAVE. SEARCH & SEIZURE 371 (1978), and cases cited therein. The deriva-
tive evidence rule has been applied at times to evidence derived from non-constitutional viola-
tions as well. /d. 
25. See National Institute of Justice, The Effects of the Exclusionary Rule: A Study in 
California I 0 ( 1982), which purports to demonstrate empirically the significant impact of the 
Exclusionary Rule. But see Impact of the Exclusionary Rule on Federal Criminal Prosecu-
tions, (Report of the Comptroller General, 4/19 /79); Nardulli, Social Costs of the Exclusion-
ary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 585 ( 1983); Davies, A Hard Look 
at What We Know About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule, AM. B. FoUND. REs. J. 611 
( 1983); Fyfe, Enforcement Workshop: The NIJ Study of the Exclusionary Rule, 19 CRIM. L. 
BULL. 253 ( 1983). 
26. Beginning with Judge Cardozo's often quoted assessment of the exclusionary rule: 
"The criminal goes free because the constable has blundered," People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 
23-24, !50 N .E. 585, 587-88 ( 1926), the debate on the rule has been "more remarkable for its 
volume than its cogency." Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for 
Wolf, 1961 SuP. CT. REv. I, 33 ( 1961 ). See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Narcotics Agents, 
403 U.S. 388, 418 ( 1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE 
( 1977); Miles, Decline of the Fourth Amendment: Time to Overrule Mapp v. Ohio, 27 CATH. 
U.L. REv. 9 ( 1977); Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JuD. 
214 ( 1978); Schlesinger, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Proponents' Proven That it is a Deter-
rent to Police, 62 JuD. 404 ( 1979). 
27. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 
433, 453-54 ( 1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-95 ( 1976); United States v. Calandra, 
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rivative, the Court has been particularly sensitive to the concern that 
the cost to society of applying the exclusionary rule exceeds the ben-
efit achieved by the deterrent impact of the rule.28 As a result, the 
Court has fashioned several exceptions to the principle that evidence 
which is the "fruit of a poisonous tree" must be excluded. 
In 1920, the Court created the independent source exception to 
the exclusionary rule. 29 Stated simply, the independent source excep-
tion provides that when the discovery of information or evidence is 
achieved both by illegal means and through an independent legal 
source, the evidence will not be suppressed. 30 This exception, accord-
ing to the current Supreme Court, stems from the principle that the 
police should not be put in a worse position than they would have 
been in had they not committed the illegality.31 For example, in a 
situation where narcotics are seized after the police learn of their 
location both through information obtained from an illegal statement 
by a defendant and through information learned from a witness 
whom they discovered legally, disallowing the use of that narcotics 
at trial would be putting the police in a worse position than they 
would have been in had they not obtained the illegal statement from 
the defendant. 
Nineteen years after outlining the independent source exception 
in Silverthorne v. United States,32 the Court identified another situa-
tion where the exclusionary rule should not be applied to derivative 
evidence. In Nardone v. United States,33 the Court held that evi-
dence may be admissible even where the discovery is linked exclu-
sively to a police illegality. The Court, in Nardone, concluded that 
414 U.S. 338, 351-52 (1974); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969). 
28. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 106-10 (1980); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 
U.S. 268, 279-80 (1978); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,491 (1963); Nardone v. 
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 ( 1939). In determining that the defendant's confession was a 
"fruit" of his "poisonous tree" illegal arrest, the Court in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-
04 ( 1975), reiterated that the existence of a causal connection between the illegality and the 
derivative evidence was not enough by itself to warrant exclusion. Instead a matrix of factors 
would have to be employed on a case by case basis to see if application of the exclusionary rule 
was justified. 
29. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 ( 1920). 
30. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 485 (quoting Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 392). The justifica-
tion for the independent source exception was stated in Sutton v. United States, 267 F.2d 271 
(4th Cir. 1959) as follows: 
It is one thing to say that officers shall gain no advantage from violating the 
individual's rights; it is quite another to declare that such a violation shall put 
him beyond the law's reach even if his guilt can be proved by evidence that has 
been obtained lawfully. 
/d. at 272. 
31. Nix v. Williams. 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984) [hereinafter Williams If]. 
32. 251 u.s. 385 ( 1920). 
33. 308 u.s. 338 ( 1939). 
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where the discovery of evidence occurs under circumstances that 
suggest that the effect of the original illegality has become "attenu-
ated" or weakened, the causal chain between the illegality and the 
discovery of the evidence may be deemed to have been broken.34 In 
such situations the evidence would no longer be considered "tainted" 
and would therefore be admissible against the defendant. 
The Court had an opportunity to explain the application of this 
attenuation doctrine in 1968 in the case of Wong Sun v. United 
States.3r. In Wong Sun the Supreme Court held that although verbal 
evidence can be the fruit of a: poisonous tree and therefore suppressi-
ble, suppression will not result automatically, even when a causal 
connection can be shown to exist between the original illegality and 
the discovered evidence.38 Expressed differently, the Court deter-
mined that merely because the evidence in question would not have 
been discovered "but for" the illegality does not mean exclusion will 
automatically result. Instead, courts should look to "whether grant-
ing establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which in-
stant objection has been made has been come at by exploitation of 
that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be 
purged of the premium taint."37 
Following his illegal arrest, Wong Sun made a statement to the 
police that he sought to have suppressed as a product of his illegal 
arrest. The Court noted that because Wong Sun had been freed after 
arraignment and had returned voluntarily several days later to make 
his statement, "the connection between the arrest and statement 'had 
become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.' " 38 Specifically, 
Wong Sun's several days of freedom after his illegal arrest and other 
events preceding his giving of the statement to the police had so 
weakened the lingering effects of his illegal arrest that it was unrea-
sonable to say that the confession resulted from an exploitation of 
the illegal arrest. 39 
The third exception to the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine 
has been applied by some state and federal courts for years but was 
never explicitly accepted by the Supreme Court until its 1984 deci-
sion in Nix v. Williams (Williams 11).4° Known as the doctrine of 
34. /d. at 341. 
35. 371 u.s. 471 ( 1963). 
36. /d. at 487-78. 
37. /d. at 488 (quoting from MAGUIRE. EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1959)). 
38. 371 U.S. at 491. 
39. /d. 
40. 467 u.s. 431 (1984). 
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inevitable discovery, this exception allows for the admission of evi-
dence whose discovery derives from a police illegality, but which the 
police can show would likely have been discovered eventually by le-
gitimate means.41 Therefore, although the challenged evidence is 
linked causally to an illegality and no attenuation has occurred, the 
police are given the opportunity to demonstrate hypothetically that 
the evidence would have been discovered by some legal means in the 
future had the illegality not occurred. In order to understand and 
assess the doctrine of inevitable discovery as outlined by the Su-
preme Court in Williams II, it is necessary to pick up the story of 
Robert Williams after the Supreme Court reversed his conviction in 
1977. 
IV. Supreme Court Acceptance of the Inevitable Discovery Doc-
trine (Williams 11)42 
At Williams' second murder trial in 1977, the prosecution intro-
duced evidence obtained from the body of Pamela Powers which was 
located as a direct result of the illegal statement obtained from Wil-
liams by Detective Leaming.43 The theory behind the trial court's 
decision to admit this evidence was that the body would have been 
discovered ultimately by a police search which was well in progress 
at the time Detective Learning obtained his statement from Wil-
liams;•• in other words, the doctrine of inevitable discovery. In af-
firming Williams' second conviction, the Iowa Supreme Court ap-
proved the trial court's use of the doctrine of inevitable discovery to 
allow evidence derived from the body to be used at Williams' trial.411 
Referring to the doctrine as "the hypothetical independent source" 
exception to the exclusionary rule, the Iowa Supreme Court con-
cluded that the necessary elements embodied in this exception were 
met in the Williams case. These elements were: "1) that the police 
did not act in bad faith for the purpose of hastening the discovery of 
the evidence in question; and 2) that the evidence in question would 
have been discovered by a lawful means."46 
With respect to the first element of the doctrine, the Iowa Su-
41. Maguire, How to Unpoison the Fruit - The Fourth Amendment and the Exclu-
sionary Rule, 55 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 307, 315-17 ( 1964). One of the first reported 
cases using the doctrine of inevitable discovery is Somer v. U.S., 138 F.2d 790, 792 (2d Cir. 
1943). 
42. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 ( 1984). 
43. /d. at 437. 
44. /d. at 437-38. 
45. State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248 (Iowa 1979). 
46. /d. at 260. 
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preme Court concluded that because there was a substantial disa-
greement over the validity of Detective Learning's "interrogation" 
among judges well-versed in criminal procedure at every level of the 
appellate process, "it can't be said that the actions of the police were 
taken in bad faith."47 Regarding the second element of the doctrine, 
the Iowa Supreme Court concluded that by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the State had shown that even without the illegally ob-
tained statement, the ongoing police search would have turned up 
the body of Pamela Powers before its condition had materially 
changed.48 
In 1981, Williams' request for a Writ of Habeas Corpus was 
denied by the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Iowa.49 The District Court agreed with the Iowa Supreme Court 
that the doctrine of inevitable discovery had been correctly applied 
by the trial court in the case. Two years later, however, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the denial of 
the Writ. 110 The eighth circuit accepted, arguendo, the Iowa Su-
preme Court's statement of the elements necessary for the 
prosecutorial use of the inevitable discovery doctrine but disagreed 
with the Iowa court's conclusion that the lack of bad faith require-
ment had been met in this case.111 Specifically, the eighth circuit re-
jected the Iowa Supreme Court's reliance on the debate among 
judges to demonstrate the lack of bad faith and instead focused on 
what it believed was the intent of Detective Learning when he ob-
tained the statement from Williams. Because the Supreme Court 
had concluded in 1977 that Learning had "deliberately," "design-
edly," and "purposely" elicited incriminating statements from Wil-
liams, and Learning had not testified at the state suppression hearing 
regarding his state of mind in taking the statement from Williams, 
the prosecution had failed to meet its burden of showing that Learn-
ing's actions were taken without bad faith. 112 Accordingly, the eighth 
circuit found it unnecessary to consider whether the state court find-
ing regarding the likely discovery of the body through legal means 
was supported by the record or even whether the preponderance of 
evidence standard adopted by the state court was the appropriate 
47. Jd. at 260-61. 
48. /d. at 261-62. 
49. Williams v. Nix, 528 F. Supp. 664 (S.D. Iowa 1981 ). 
50. Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164 (1983). 
51. /d. at 1159. 
52. ld. at 1170-73. 
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one.113 
Reversing the eighth circuit, the Supreme Court held in Wil-
liams II that there was indeed an exception to the exclusionary rule 
known as the doctrine of inevitable discovery, but that proper appli-
cation of the doctrine did not depend on a showing of the lack of bad 
faith on the part of the police.114 Therefore, the Court felt it unneces-
sary to enter the debate between the Iowa Supreme Court and the 
eighth circuit concerning whether Detective Learning's "interroga-
tion" of Williams was not only illegal but also conducted in bad 
faith. Instead, the Court ruled that where the state can show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the evidence discovered as a re-
sult of a police illegality would likely have been found eventually 
through legal means, that evidence is admissible in the state's case-
in-chief.1111 
Prior to the court's holding in Williams II, there was debate 
among courts and commentators about the wisdom of such a "hypo-
thetical independent source doctrine." Proponents argued that soci-
ety was being punished disproportionately when courts suppressed il-
legally obtained probative evidence that would inevitably have been 
discovered through legal means.116 Opponents objected to the specu-
lative nature of the doctrine and its likely effect of encouraging im-
proper police shortcuts to the detriment of the exclusionary rule's 
goal of deterring such behavior.117 In Williams II, however, the Court 
53. /d. at 1169. 
54. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 442-48. 
55. /d. at 444. 
56. 3 LAfAVE, supra note 19, at 623. See. e.g., Papp v. Jago, 650 F.2d 1181 (6th Cir. 
1981); United States v. Bienvenue, 632 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Brookins, 
614 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir. 1980); United States ex rei Owens v. Twomey, 508 F.2d 867 (7th 
Cir. 1975); Govt. of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. 
Seohnlein, 423 F.2d 1051 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 413 (1970); Wayne v. United 
States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963); Somer v. United 
States, 138 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1943); People v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 3d 665, 145 Cal. 
Rptr. 795 (1978); People v. Fitzpatrick, 300 N.E.2d 139 (NY 1973). See also LaCount and 
Girese, The "Inevitable Discovery" Rule, an Evolving Exception to the Constitutional Exclu-
sionary Rule, 40 ALB. L. REv. 483 ( 1976); Maguire, How to Unpoison the Fruit - The 
Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule, 55 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 307 (1964). 
57. 3 LAfAVE, supra note 19, at 623. See. e.g., United States v. Houlton, 525 F.2d 943 
(5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Castellana, 488 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1974); Parker v. Estelle, 
498 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Note, The Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Con-
stitutional Exclusionary Rule, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 88, 99-100 ( 1974); Pitler, "The Fruits of 
the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 579, ( 1968) [hereinafter 
Pitler) (wherein the author writes: 
For the present, the exclusionary rule, designed to discourage illegal activity 
is useless if the police may unlawfully invade a man's home, illegally seize evi-
dence and then claim "we would have obtained it anyway" and that the exclu-
sionary rule is not designed to make the "theoretical availability" of evidence an 
excuse for obtaining it illegally. 
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decided upon an application of the doctrine which was limited only 
by the likelihood of discovery. As to this one limitation, the Court 
imposed the lowest burden of proof conceivable.118 In defending its 
decision to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine in this form, the 
Court drew support from its prior decisions concerning derivative ev-
idence and the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine. 
The Court correctly referred to its prior holdings in 
Silverthorne v. United States and Wong Sun v. United States for the 
proposition that evidence which is derived from a police illegality 
need not always be suppressed by the fruits of the poisonous tree 
doctrine. Specifically, the Court quoted from Wong Sun as follows: 
We need not hold that all evidence is "fruit of the poison-
ous tree" simply because it would not have come to light but for 
the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question 
in such a case is whether granting establishment of the primary 
illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has 
been come at by exploitation of that illegality or· instead by 
means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary 
taint.39 
This paragraph shows the view of the Wong Sun Court that the exis-
tence of a causal connection between illegal police conduct and the 
discovery of evidence does not automatically require the suppression 
of that evidence. Instead, courts should look to whether the police 
exploited the illegality or recovered the evidence through other 
means that are sufficiently remote as to be "purged" of the illegal-
ity.80 The court in Williams II, however, went far beyond this inter-
pretation of the above passage and discerned that the Wong Sun 
court "thus pointedly negated the kind of good faith requirement ad-
vanced by the Court of Appeals. "81 
/d. at 630. 
58. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 444. 
59. /d. at 442 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963)). 
60. One commentator interprets this paragraph in Wong Sun as offering a two step ap-
proach for analyzing causation for purposes of applying the exclusionary rule. First, the Court 
requires a "logical" or "descriptive" process that looks to whether "but for" the illegality, 
would the evidence have been discovered. If the evidence would not have been discovered with-
out the illegality, there follows an "ascriptive" step that assesses the "continuing," "signifi-
cant" impact of the illegal action upon the subsequent discovery of the evidence. Further, the 
use of the term "exploitation" itself suggests that the Court would view the purposefulness of 
the police conduct as relevant. Ruffin, Out on a Limb of the Poisonous Tree: The Tainted 
Witness, 15 UCLA L. REv. 32, 38 ( 1967). See also, Piller, supra note 57, at 588-89. 
61. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 442. If by this statement the Court means only that the 
Wong Sun Court was not imposing a mandatory good faith requirement on all applications of 
the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine, that conclusion is rather unremarkable. If, on the 
other hand, the Court is interpreting the "exploitation" paragraph of Wong Sun to mean that 
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In adopting the inevitable discovery exception without a good 
faith prerequisite, the Court found support for its position in the in-
dependent source exception to the exclusionary rule's derivative evi-
dence principle. The derivative evidence principle, according to the 
Court in Williams II, rests on the notion that society needs to deter 
police from gaining any benefit from their illegal conduct whether 
that benefit be direct or indirect. To accomplish that deterrent pur-
pose, derivative evidence acquired as a result of an antecedent illegal 
police practice is not useable by the government even though that 
evidence is probative on the issue of the defendant's guilt.62 On the 
other hand, the Court observed, application of the independent 
source exception insures that the prosecution will be put "in no 
worse position" because of some earlier police error or misconduct.63 
According to the Court, this principle of putting the police in the 
same position that they would have been in had the illegality not 
occurred achieves the proper balance between the competing societal 
interests of deterring police impropriety and having juries receive all 
probative evidence. Since, in its opinion, the inevitable discovery doc-
trine and independent source doctrines have a "functional similar-
ity," the Court maintained that, as with the independent source doc-
trine, the "no worse off'' principle should be applied when 
considering the breadth and the limitations of the inevitable discov-
ery doctrine.64 
In a recent article, Professors Wasserstrom and Merten have 
taken issue with the Court's grafting of the "no worse off'' principle 
onto the exclusionary rule.611 They note that in those cases which cre-
ated and fleshed out the independent source rule, such as 
Silverthorne, the Court never relied on the "no worse off'' justifica-
the good faith (absence of purposefulness and ftagrance in the illegal police activity) of the 
police is irrelevant to a decision whether to suppress derivative evidence, that is a novel ap-
proach to the fruits doctrine supported by neither precedent nor logic. In fact, in deciding 
whether derivative evidence obtained after an illegal police action can avoid suppression be-
cause of the attenuation doctrine, (the very issue in Wong Sun, to which the "exploitation" 
paragraph was directed), the Court has consistently assessed the purposefulness and the fta-
grance of the police illegality. See Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 693 ( 1982); Rawlings v. 
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 99-100 (1980); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218 (1979); 
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 279-80 ( 1978); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 
( 1975). Were the fact that an officer acted purposefully in violating a suspect's rights irrele-
vant in considering whether to apply the exclusionary rule, the rule would lose much of its 
deterrent impact. United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577, 584-85 (2d Cir. 1970)). 
62. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 442-43. 
63. /d. at 443. 
64. !d. at 443-44. 
65. Wasserstrom & Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was It a 
Fair Trial?, 22 AM. CRJM. L. REV. 85, 158-66 (1984). 
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tion, but instead emphasized that where there is an independent 
source which leads to the discovery of evidence, no exploitation of 
the illegality has in fact occurred.66 Further, if the "no worse off" 
rule is interpreted to mean what it seems to say, the Court is com-
municating to the police that there is no real price to be paid for 
illegal conduct no matter how flagrant or purposeful, and regardless 
of how seriously a specific constitutional right is affected,67 when an-
other source of discovery exists. It is not difficult to see how this 
principle would materially diminish the deterrent impact of the ex-
clusionary rule. 
Even if one accepts the Court's questionable grafting of the "no 
worse off'' concept onto the independent source rule, the Court's as-
sertion that the "no worse off'' concept would therefore automati-
cally be applicable to the inevitable discovery doctrine is unpersua-
sive. Without analysis, the Court discerns a "functional similarity" 
between the independent source and the inevitable discovery doc-
trines which logically compels the application of the "no worse off'' 
rule to the inevitable discovery doctrine. The "no worse off'' rule 
then serves as a justification for the Court's holding that the question 
of whether the police acted purposefully or flagrantly in committing 
their illegality is irrelevant to the issue of whether the inevitable dis-
covery doctrine applies. A closer examination of the doctrine of inev-
itable discovery reveals that it is different from the independent 
source rule in a fundamental way and, in fact, is more properly com-
pared to another exception to the exclusionary rule's derivative evi-
dence principle, attenuation.68 Once it is understood how the inevita-
ble discovery doctrine is fundamentally similar to the attenuation 
exception, it then follows that, as with the attenuation doctrine, 
courts considering application of the inevitable discovery exception 
should assess the purposefulness and flagrance of the police 
misconduct. 
66. /d. at 159. 
67. Different constitutional rights are designed to safeguard different interests and, ar-
guably, require the protection of the exclusionary rule in different ways. Thus deciding 
whether to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine to evidence obtained in violation of the sixth 
amendment may require a consideration of different factors than deciding its application in a 
fourth amendment case. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 452-57 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also, 
Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 65, at 175-78; Comment, Inevitable Discovery: the Hy-
pothetical Independent Source Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 137, 
140-43 (1976). 
68. Attenuation or "'dissipation of the taint' attempts to mark the point at which the 
detrimental consequences of illegal police action become so attenuated that the deterrent effect 
of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost." Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 
( 1975) (Powell, J., concurring). 
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As the Court conceded, the independent source exception is not 
applicable to the facts of Nix v. Williams since the sole source of the 
discovery of the Powers girl's body was the illegal statement ob-
tained from Williams.69 While the independent search for the girl's 
body may have ultimately discovered the body, whether it actually 
would have is clearly a hypothetical question. Although the Court 
noted and then quickly passed over this distinction, it is an essential 
one in any exclusionary rule analysis. 
When there is no causal link between the police illegality and 
the ultimate discovery of secondary evidence in question because the 
police use a source independent of the illegality to uncover the evi-
dence, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable.70 When there is such a 
causal link, the derivative evidence principle of the exclusionary rule 
applies, but it then becomes necessary to determine whether the need 
to exclude the evidence is overcome by countervailing factors. 71 Such 
a situation exists, for example, when the effect of an illegal police 
action upon the ultimate discovery of evidence is attenuated to such 
a degree that the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule would 
not require the suppression of the derivative evidence.72 Where this 
causal connection exists, courts typically focus on whether there has 
been an exploitation of the illegal police conduct in determining 
whether the evidence acquired should be excluded.73 
An examination of the existence and the degree of exploitation 
necessarily includes an assessment of the intent of the police officer 
and the degree of approbrium that should be attached to the police 
activity involved.74 Using the fourth amendment as his subject, 
69. Williams II. 467 U.S. at 443. 
70. Wong Sun v. United States. 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963) (quoting from Silverthorne 
Lumber Co. v. United States. 251 U.S. 385, 392 ( 1920). 
71. Commonwealth v. Benoit, 382 Mass. 210,233-34 (1981); 3 LAfAVE, supra note 19, 
at 616-18; Note, The Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 16 SuFFOLK 
U.L. REv. I 043, I 049-50 ( 1982). For similar reasoning with respect to application of the 
fourth amendment. see Moylan, The Fourth Amendment Inapplicable v. The Fourth Amend-
ment Satisfied: The Neglected Threshold of "So What." 1977 So. ILL. L.J. 75 ( 1977). 
72. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); 3 LAfAVE, 
supra note 19, at 615; Note, Fruits of the Poisonous Tree - A Plea For Relevant Criteria, 
115 U. PA. L. REV. 1136, 1148-49 ( 1967). 
73. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 470 ( 1980); United States v. Ceccolini, 437 
U.S. 268, 274· 75 ( 1978); Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88; United States v. Martinez, 512 F.2d 
830, 832 (5th Cir. 1975); Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. 
denied, 375 U.S. 860 ( 1963). See also, Ruffin, supra note 60 at 38, 73; Note, supra note 71 at 
1048-49. 
74. See United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 570 (2nd Cir. 1970). In Edmons, the court 
said: "the Government exploits an unlawful arrest when it obtains a conviction on the basis of 
the very evidence ... which it hoped to obtain by its unconstitutional act." /d. at 584. See 
also United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 279-80; Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 604; Michi-
gan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,447 (1974); 3 LAFAVE supra note 19, at 673; Pitler, supra note 
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Judge Charles Moylan has explained the distinction between a situa-
tion in which a principle is inapplicable and one in which it may be 
deemed to have been satisfied.711 Primarily, this difference reflects a 
distinction between defining the limits of the principle on one hand 
and describing its values on another. Although the ultimate result of 
a finding that the fourth amendment is inapplicable is the same as a 
finding that the fourth amendment is satisfied (that is, the evidence 
is admissible), the reasoning which leads to this result is quite differ-
ent. In Judge Moylan's words: 
When the Fourth Amendment is satisfied, Constitutional 
liberty is vindicated. God is in his heaven and all is right with 
the world. Involved is a matrix of values including such fine 
things as warrants, oaths and affirmations, particularity of 
description, probable cause, exigency, good faith on the part of 
the police officer and the sanctity of thresholds . . . . When 
however the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable, good and evil 
have no relevance.76 
Similarly, the independent source exception can be viewed as a 
situation in which the exclusionary rule is inapplicable because there 
is no causal connection between the illegality and discovery of the 
evidence.77 Both the attenuation and inevitable discovery doctrines, 
on the other hand, are examples of the exclusionary rule satisfied in 
that the illegal police conduct involved in each does lead to the dis-
covery of the challenged evidence, but other factors relevant to the 
purposes behind the exclusionary rule may result in overcoming the 
need to suppress the evidence.78 
In its treatment of the attenuation doctrine, the Supreme Court 
has consistently acknowledged the importance of looking to the in-
tent of the police officer and the nature of his illegal conduct.79 
There are two reasons why the fact that an officer committed an 
illegality purposefully and in a flagrant manner would be relevant to 
56, at 597. 
75. Moylan. supra note 71. at 75. 
76. /d. 
77. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 478. See also Commonwealth v. Benoit, 382 Mass. 210, 
233-34, 415 N.E.2d 818, 822 (1981); Note, supra note 71 at 1049. 
78. Regarding attenuation, see United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 274-75; Brown v. 
Illinois, 422 U.S. at 609 ( 1975) (Powell, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Benoit, 382 Mass. 
210, 233-34, 415 N .E.2d 818, 822 ( 1981 ); Ruffin, supra note 60, at 73; Comment, supra note 
65, at 147; Note, supra note 71, at 1050. 
79. See. e.g., Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 693; Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 
98, 109-10 (1982); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218 (1979); United States v. Cec-
colini, 435 U.S. at 279-80 (1978); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 604-05,609-12 (1975) (Pow-
ell, J .• concurring). 
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any analysis of whether the doctrine of attenuation should be applied 
to the facts of a given case. First, the more flagrant and purposeful 
the police conduct is, the less likely it is that the impact of the con-
duct upon the defendant would be weakened.8° For example, in a 
situation in which the defendant challenges a confession that is ob-
tained after an illegal arrest, the details surrounding that illegal ar-
rest concerning the bad faith, purposefulness and the flagrance of the 
police conduct would be important factors. The more outrageous the 
police conduct in effecting the illegal arrest, the more likely it is that 
the impact of that illegality would still be felt by the defendant at 
the time he makes his statement and, therefore, the less likely it is 
that the impact of the illegality has attenuated. 
The second reason why courts and commentators have looked to 
the flagrancy and the purposefulness of police wrongdoing in attenu-
ation cases is because such conduct impacts directly and significantly 
on the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule. 81 In Brown v. Illi-
nois,82 the Supreme Court considered the admissibility of a state-
ment made following an illegal arrest and after the proper adminis-
tration of the Miranda warnings. The Court noted that: "[i]f 
Miranda warnings, by themselves, were held to attenuate the taint of 
an unconstitutional arrest, regardless of how wanton and purposeful 
the Fourth Amendment violations, the effect of the Exclusionary 
Rule would be substantially diluted."83 In holding that statement to 
be a fruit of the improper arrest, the Gourt in Brown relied to a 
significant extent on its conclusion that the intent of the officers in 
80. See Brown v. Illinois, 442 U.S. at 604. The Brown Court referred to the purposeful-
ness and the flagrancy of the police action as the "most important" factors in determining 
attenuation. See also, Brown, 442 U.S. at 611 (Powell, J., concurring); Bain & Kelly, Fruits 
of the Poisonous Tree: Recent Developments as Viewed Through It's Exceptions, 31 U. 
MIAMI L. REv. 615, 648 (1977). In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the Court, 
after noting the need to assess the costs and deterrent benefits of applying the exclusionary 
rule, said: "Not surprisingly in view of this purpose, an assessment of the flagrancy of the 
police misconduct constitutes an important step in the process." /d. at 911. 
81. See 3 LAFAVE supra note 19, at 653, 658-59; Comment, The Fourth Amendment 
and Tainted Confessions: Admissibility As A Policy Decision, 13 Hous. L. REV. 753, 768-72 
(1976); Note, supra note 72, at 1148-50; Note, supra note 71 at 1050. See also Wasserstrom 
& Mertens, supra note 65, at 155 n.465 (describing the holding in Taylor v. Alabama, 457 
U.S. 687 ( 1982) as a reflection of the Supreme Court's recognition that application of the 
attenuation doctrine requires more than just an assessment of how much the taint has actually 
dissipated. Additionally the Court, in the author's opinion, must have placed significant weight 
on the fact that "the police succeeded in obtaining just what they sought to gain"). Once it is 
established that the police have purposely and flagrantly violated a suspects constitutional 
rights, the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule warrants suppression of the defendant's 
confession. 
82. 422 U.S. 590 (1975). 
83. /d. at 602. 
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effecting the arrest was to elicit the very statement at issue.8' Fur-
thermore, as Justice Powell pointed out in his concurring opinion, 
where the illegal police conduct is flagrant, the need for the deter-
rence achieved by the application of the exclusionary rule is more 
acute. 811 
In Taylor v. Alabama,86 both the five justice majority and the 
three justices who joined in Justice O'Connor's dissent agreed that 
the flagrancy and purposefulness of the police conduct is an impor-
tant fact in determining whether the defendant's statement was a 
fruit of her illegal arrest.87 The issue in United States v. Ceccolini86 
was whether the testimony of a witness discovered through an illegal 
search could be said to be sufficiently unconnected to the illegal 
search so that the attenuation exception would apply. After discuss-
ing the difference between live witnesses and inanimate objects for 
purposes of applying the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine, the 
Court noted that the officer's illegal search was committed without 
the intent to find such a witness. The Court concluded that absent 
such an intent there would be no deterrent impact in suppressing the 
witness' testimony.89 
When the prosecution seeks to have evidence admitted through 
the doctrine of inevitable discovery, it is understood that, as with 
evidence sought to be introduced through the attenuation exception, 
the discovery of the evidence in question was derived in fact from the 
knowledge gained through illegal police activity.90 Therefore, as with 
the attenuation doctrine, and unlike the independent source rule, 
consideration of the inevitable discovery doctrine presumes that the 
exclusionary rule is applicable. If evidence is ultimately admitted 
based on the inevitable discovery exception, again as with attenua-
tion and unlike the independent source rule, the exclusionary rule, 
although applicable, has been satisfied. In assessing whether the ex-
clusionary rule has been satisfied, courts should consider all of the 
relevant purposes, values, principles and balancing factors that ac-
company the rule and then apply it to the facts of the case at hand.91 
84. /d. at 604. 
85. /d. at 611 (Powell, J., concurring). 
86. 457 u.s. 687 ( 1982). 
87. /d. at 693. See also, Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 99-100 (1980). 
88. 435 u.s. 268 ( 1978). 
89. /d. at 279-80. See also, Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 ( 1979). In Dunaway, 
the Court noted that where a close causal connection exists between an illegal detention and 
subsequent confession, there is a greater need for the deterrent protection of the exclusionary 
rule. /d. at 218. 
90. Williams II 467 U.S. at 443. 
91. See Moylan, supra note 71, at 75. 
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Unfortunately, in adopting its version of the inevitable discovery doc-
trine in Williams II, the Court concluded that any time the chal-
lenged evidence would more likely than not have been discovered 
even without the illegal police conduct, then "the deterrence ration-
ale has so little basis that the evidence should be received."92 For 
those who might doubt this assertion, the Court continued, "any-
thing less would reject logic, experience and common sense."93 
The Court's conclusion that there is never a benefit to be de-
rived from excluding illegally obtained evidence once the prosecution 
can show the likelihood of ultimate discovery through lawful means 
is a most significant one. The result of such a conclusion is that 
courts will essentially ignore illegal police activity that may be both 
purposeful and flagrant. In other words, if the prosecutor can con-
vince the judge that evidence more likely than not would have been 
discovered even without the illegal police conduct, it is immaterial to 
the admissibility of that evidence that the police knowingly violated 
the defendant's rights in order to uncover that very evidence. 
In refusing to require courts to do a case by case assessment of 
the need to deter (as demonstrated by the purposefulness and fla-
grance of the police misconduct) before applying the inevitable dis-
covery doctrine, the Court not only rejects comparison to attenuation 
cases but additionally ignores a significant aspect of recent exclu-
sionary rule cases.94 As the concept of deterrence has become the 
prime justification for the exclusionary rule,911 the Court has consist-
ently examined the nature of the wrong and the purposefulness of 
police misconduct.98 Only recently the Court ruled that, at least in 
92. Williams II 467 U.S. at 444. 
93. /d. 
94. See, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908-12 (1984) (requiring case-by-case 
analysis of whether deterrence would be achieved by admitting evidence seized pursuant to 
invalid search warrant); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (case-by-case assessment of 
multiple factors in determining attenuation); Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 ( 1982) (reaf-
firming case-by-case approach taken in Brown); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 
(1978) (rejecting per se rule re live witness not being "fruit" in favor of case-by-case analysis 
of cost/benefit factors); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 ( 1977) (rejecting per se rule 
regarding application of sixth amendment-based exclusionary rule to attorney-client privilege 
violation in favor or assessing several factors including the purposefulness of the police viola-
tion); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 ( 1980) (multifactor case-by-case approach to admis-
sibility of statement following illegal detention). 
95. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 908-21 (1984); United States v. Janis, 428 
U.S. 433, 446 ( 1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 ( 1976); United States v. Peltier, 422 
U.S. 531, 536 (1975); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974). 
96. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 906-25; Taylor, 457 U.S. at 693; Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 99-
100; Janis, 428 U.S. at 458-59 n.35; Brown, 422 U.S. at 602, 604; United States v. Peltier, 
422 U.S. 531,538-39 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,447 (1974). See also Bivens 
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 418 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); United 
States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577, 584 ( 1970); Pitler, supra note 57, at 597; Comment, supra 
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warrant cases, the determining factor in the decision whether to ex-
clude evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment is 
whether the police acted in good faith. 97 In other words, evidence 
will be suppressed if the police purposely avoided the requirements 
of the fourth amendment in obtaining a warrant or should have 
known that the warrant that they acted upon was in fact deficient.98 
Given the Supreme Court's inclination to look at both the pur-
posefulness and the flagrancy of police illegality in exclusionary rule 
decisions, and the significance of these two factors in accomplishing 
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule, it is important to ana-
lyze the Court's justification for eliminating consideration of these 
factors with respect to application of the inevitable discovery doc-
trine. In Williams II the Court specifically rejected the eighth cir-
cuit's conclusion that: "[i]f an absence of bad faith requirement were 
not imposed, the temptation to risk deliberate violations of the Sixth 
Amendment would be too great and the deterrent effect of the Ex-
clusionary Rule reduced too far."99 The Court reasoned that an of-
ficer who has the opportunity to acquire evidence illegally will sel-
dom be able to determine at that time whether the evidence sought 
would be discovered inevitably by legal means. Since deterrence is 
achieved only when an officer is aware of the consequences of his 
illegal conduct and in inevitable discovery factual scenarios he can-
not so calculate, the Court concluded that no deterrent benefit is 
achieved by suppressing evidence that likely would have been discov-
ered in any event,l 00 If, however, the officer does believe that the 
evidence will likely be discovered by legal means, he has no incentive 
to shortcut the legal method, presumably because of the danger that 
suppression would result. 101 In the Court's view, the fear of depart-
mental discipline and the possibility of incurring civil liability also 
note 67 at 142-3; Comment, supra note 81 at 753, 768-72; Note, supra note 71 at 148-51. 
97. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Massachusetts v. Shephard, 468 U.S. 
981 (1984). 
98. See id. 
99. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 465 (quoting from Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164, 1169 
n.5 (1983). 
100. Williams II 467 U.S. at 445-46. 
101. One might just as reasonably assert that when an officer believes evidence he is 
thinking of obtaining illegally will ultimately be discovered by legal means, he may as well use 
the illegal shortcut because the evidence will be admitted in any event under the Court's test. 
When he believes the evidence will not be legally discovered ultimately, he still may as well 
use the illegal shortcut because he has a chance to later convince a judge of a hypothetical 
legal discovery, and, in any event, he loses nothing by illegally obtaining evidence he could not 
otherwise obtain. Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 65, at 167-71; Comment, Leading 
Cases of the 1983 Supreme Court Term, 98 HARV. L. REV. 87, 125-26 ( 1984); Note, supra 
note 71, at 1143. 
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discourages the police officer from using illegal shortcuts. 102 This ex-
planation of why it is irrelevant to consider the possible bad faith of 
a police officer in applying the inevitable discovery doctrine reflects a 
skewed view of both the need and the means necessary to discourage 
purposeful police misconduct as well as a surprising naivete about 
law enforcement in general. 
As the Court noted, an officer contemplating illegal conduct to 
acquire evidence will likely be unable to judge whether that same 
evidence would "inevitably" be discovered by legal means. This as-
sertion, while possibly valid, is largely irrelevant because of the 
Court's misleading use of the word "inevitable." The Court's asser-
tion makes sense only if the word inevitable is used in its dictionary 
sense, that is, "incapable of being avoided." 103 Later, within the Wil-
liams II opinion, we learn that the Court's use of the inevitable dis-
covery doctrine really means that an officer need show only the like-
lihood of discovery by a preponderance of the evidence.10" In other 
words, when contemplating the use of an illegal shortcut to obtain 
evidence, an officer will know that illegally seized evidence can be 
saved if a judge can be persuaded that it was more likely than not 
that the evidence would have been discovered eventually through 
other means. While an officer rarely may be in a position to assess 
whether a piece of evidence will "inevitably" be discovered, it is far 
more likely that he will be able to form a reasonable opinion about 
whether the evidence "probably" will be discovered. If an officer 
concludes that evidence he is contemplating obtaining illegally would 
likely be later discovered legally, and acting on this assumption he 
chooses the illegal shortcut to obtain the evidence, a decision to ad-
mit such evidence would clearly weaken the deterrent purpose of the 
exclusionary rule. 1011 
As the Court has repeatedly asserted, the exclusionary rule best 
serves its goals when it is applied in situations of bad faith miscon-
duct by the police. 106 The more purposeful the misconduct, the 
I 02. Williams II 467 U.S. at 444. 
103. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 672 (1969). 
104. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 444. The Court still requires a showing of "inevitability" 
but this "inevitability" must be shown only by a preponderance of the evidence, thus making 
use of the word "inevitable" superfluous if not misleading. 
I 05. See infra notes 179-89 and accompanying text. 
106. In Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, (1974), the Court stated: 
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the 
police have engaged in willful, or at the very least, negligent conduct which has 
deprived the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a 
result of such conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular investigating 
officers, or in their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the 
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greater the need to deter and the more effective is the lesson for 
those contemplating future illegalities.107 Conversely, allowing the 
use of evidence which is discovered through a deliberate violation of 
the law communicates to the police the possibility, if not the likeli-
hood, of benefiting from their own purposeful wrongdoing.108 Quite 
often the pressure upon police to conclude an investigation is intense, 
and the temptation to act without obeying the rules is great. The 
doctrine of inevitable discovery, when applied without any regard for 
the purposefulness or flagrant nature of the police misconduct, adds 
immeasurably to that temptation.109 There may be, therefore, con-
trary to the Court's assertion, much to be gained in a police officer's 
mind from acting illegally when he believes the evidence is likely to 
be eventually discovered by legal means. When there is in the police 
officer's mind a likelihood of ultimate discovery, he can save time 
and avoid what may be viewed as needless effort by choosing an ille-
gal shortcut. 
The Court's response to this contention is to take note of "sig-
nificant disincentives," other than the exclusionary rule, that act as a 
deterrence to police misconduct. As examples, the Court cites de-
partmental disciplinary proceedings and the possibility of civil liabil-
ity.110 In fact, neither of these "significant disincentives" has ever 
been shown to act as a meaningful deterrent to police illegality. 
Those constitutional violations which cause no physical injury are 
rarely the cause for police discipline. 111 Civil suits as a solution to 
police actions in violation of the exclusionary rule have been largely 
rights of the accused. Where the official action was pursued in complete good 
faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force. 
/d. at 447. See also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 907-12; United States v. Janis, 433 U.S. 
433.459 n.35 (1976); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590,610-12 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); 
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 537-39 ( 1975). 
107. Brown, 422 U.S. at 611 (Powell, J., concurring); 3 LAFAVE supra note 19, at 616; 
Israel, Criminal Procedure: The Burger Court and The Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 
MICH. L. REv. 1319, 1413-14 (1977); Piller, supra note 57 at 597; Comment, supra note 67, 
at 142-43; Comment, supra note 81, at 772; Note, Inevitable Discovery in New York: Further 
Limitation of the Exclusionary Rule, 43 ALB. L. REv. 145, !59 ( 1978); Note, supra note 71, 
at 1150. 
108. 3 LAFAVE supra note 19, at 658; Pitler, supra note 57, at 597, 630; Note, supra 
note 56, at 99-100. 
I 09. Comment, supra note I 0, at 126; Note, supra note II, at 1143; Note, supra note 
57, at 99. In Professor LaFave's words, "If the rule [Inevitable Discovery] were applied when 
such a shortcut was intentionally taken, the effect would be to read out of the Fourth Amend-
ment the requirement that other more elaborate and protective procedures be followed." 3 
LAFAVE, supra note 19, at 624. 
110. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 446. 
Ill. Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. 
REv. 493, 494 ( 1955). Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary 
Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 243, 273 (1973). 
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unsuccessful because of the unlikelihood of actual and significant re-
covery by plaintiffs. 112 Imagine, for example, Robert Williams ap-
pearing before a jury of Iowans and requesting money damages 
against Detective Learning and the State of Iowa for violating Wil-
liams' sixth amendment rights by tricking him into revealing where 
he discarded the lifeless body of Pamela Powers. The vast majority 
of criminal offenders as plaintiffs in such cases are unlikely to draw 
sympathy or recover significant damages from police defendants. Ac-
cordingly, attorneys are unlikely to take such cases on a contingency 
basis, and hence, it is unsurprising that so few of these cases have 
actually gone to trial. 113 
In those situations where the officer believes it is unlikely that 
the evidence will ever be discovered except for his illegal methods, a 
thinking officer might believe he has nothing to lose by undertaking 
such illegal conduct and hoping he can later convince a sympathetic 
judge of the hypothetical likelihood of legal discovery. 114 Thus, con-
trary to the Court's assertion, after Williams II, a police officer may 
contemplate an illegal method for acquiring evidence, and quite rea-
sonably conclude that the illegal method is a worthwhile means of 
pursuit despite the fact that the evidence would most likely not have 
been discovered through legal means. 
It appears that under Williams II, the only curb on the use of 
the doctrine of inevitable discovery is the requirement that the police 
show the probability of discovery by legal means. m In the Court's 
view, to exclude evidence that would likely have been discovered 
eventually through legal means results in a major weakening of the 
truth finding process without achieving any concomitant benefit in 
112. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 
N.Y.U.LREv. 785, 787 ( 1970); Spiotto, supra note I 09 at 272; See also Newman, Suing the 
Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section /983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' 
Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 454 ( 1978) (suggesting why the plaintiffs might be unsuccess-
ful: "(a]t the defendant's table sits the police officers - well groomed, in full uniform and 
with the American flag figuratively wrapped around them ... the ... plaintiff is likely to be 
Black or Puerto Rican, poor, disheveled, a felon and often a drug addict."). See generally, 
Project, Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781 ( 1979); Wasserstrom & Mer-
tens, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and De-
railing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365, 372 ( 1970) (arguing that an effective tort remedy would 
deter lawful police misconduct and an ineffective tort remedy would provide no deterrence). 
113. Amsterdam, supra note 112, at 787 (offering other reasons attorney might not be 
anxious to sue police); Foote, supra note Ill, at 500; Wassertstrom & Mertens, supra note 
112, at 408 n.209 (lawyer unlikely to take case based on unpredictability of damages and 
client unlikely to assume high legal fees in such a situation). 
114. See supra note I 0 I. 
115. Williams /1, 467 U.S. at 444, 447. "But when, as here, the evidence in question 
would inevitably have been discovered without reference to the police error or misconduct, 
there is no nexus sufficient to provide a taint and the evidence is admissible." ld. at 448. 
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deterrence. Such a factorless interpretation of the doctrine can cause 
grave harm to certain fundamental constitutional protections. Per-
haps most obvious among these protections threatened by the Court's 
broad application of the inevitable discovery doctrine is the warrant 
requirement of the fourth amendment. 116 
Taken literally, the Court's opinion in Williams II would permit 
the use of evidence seized in a house that the police have probable 
cause to search but for which they deliberately postpone seeking a 
warrant. The police could argue that since a warrant would have 
been obtained had one been sought (as probable cause to search was 
present), and since the evidence would have been discovered anyway, 
it should be admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. In 
Segura v. United States,117 the Court applied similar reasoning in its 
use of the independent source doctrine to save certain evidence 
seized after a warrantless entry into a house. 118 
The Supreme Court has yet to confront a situation either di-
rectly or indirectly in which it would need to determine whether the 
doctrine of inevitable discovery could be used to overcome deliberate 
police attempts to avoid the warrant requirement. 119 Both state and 
federal courts have come to different conclusions as to whether evi-
dence seized without a warrant should be admitted under the inevi-
116. The Warrant Clause of the fourth amendment reads, "and no Warrant shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
117. 468 U.S. 796 (1984). 
118. In Segura, the Court was faced with a warrantless entry into the defendant's house 
effected in order to "secure" the house and avoid the destruction or removal of evidence. As 
soon as possible, a warrant would have been obtained and a full search of the premises con-
ducted. During the entry into the house and a security check that was conducted shortly there-
after, contraband was observed in plain view. /d. at 800-01. 
Some 19 hours after the initial entry, the police obtained a proper search warrant and 
conducted a full search of the apartment. Cocaine, a revolver, and $150,000 in cash were 
among the items seized during the warrant-based search. /d. at 80 I. 
The Supreme Court did not address the lower court's decision to suppress the evidence 
observed during the initial entry and security check, as the product of an illegal entry. The 
Court focused its attention instead on the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant, 
evidence alleged by the defendant similarly to be the "fruit" of the illegal entry. /d. at 813. 
The Court held that this evidence was obtained not during the initial entry and possession 
of the home but instead during the warrant-based search. As the warrant authorizing the 
search was based on information entirely independent of that acquired during the illegal entry 
and occupation of the apartment, the independent source exception allows for the admissibility 
of the evidence. In so holding, the Court specifically rejected the contention of the dissenting 
justices that given the possibility of removal or destruction of the evidence by the defendant's 
cohorts before the warrant was obtained, the seizure of the challenged evidence was dependent 
on the illegal entry and continued possession of the apartment. Thus, according to the dissent, 
the independent source exception was inapplicable. !d. at 831-36 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The 
Court's response was to label this possibility of destruction or removal as "pure speculation." 
/d. at 816. 
119. See infra notes 174-78 and accompanying text. 
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table discovery doctrine! 20 Significantly, post-Williams II cases ad-
mitting such evidence have taken a view of the inevitable discovery 
doctrine similar to that proposed by the Court in Williams II; since 
ultimately the evidence would likely have been discovered through 
legal means, the police should not be unduly punished for their fail-
ure to obtain a warrant. 121 The danger of such thinking is that it 
reflects nothing less than a direct attack upon the principles behind 
the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. 
The purpose of the warrant requirement of the fourth amend-
ment is to insure that magistrates will be interposed between the 
forces of government and the individual suspect. 122 These magis-
trates are charged with the responsibility of forming their own opin-
ions as to whether probable cause exists prior to the time that the 
120. Cases rejecting application of the inevitable discovery doctrine to searches con-
ducted in violation of the warrant requirement include: United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 
827 (lith Cir. 1984): United States v. Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981); United 
States v. Griflin, 502 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1974): People v. Young, 159 Cal. App. 3d 138, 205 
Cal. Rptr. 402, (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); People v. Schoondermark, 717 P.2d 504, 506 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1985); Commonwealth v. Benoit, 382 Mass. 210, 415 N.E.2d 818 (1981); State v. John-
son, 301 N.W.2d 625 (N.D. 1981): State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214,495 A.2d 90 (1985); People 
v. Knapp, 52 N.Y.2d 689, 442 N.E.2d 531, 439 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1981); People v. Sciacca, 45 
N.Y.2d 122,379 N.E.2d 1153,356 N.Y.S.2d 703 (1978). But see United States v. Whitehorn, 
No. 86-5524, Slip op. at __ (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736 (5th 
Cir. 1986); United States v. Moscatiello & Carter, 771 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. 
granted, Murray and Carter v. U.S., 107 S. Ct. 1368 (1987); United States v. Merriweather, 
777 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Apker, 705 F.2d 293, 309-10 (8th Cir. 1983); 
United States v. Levasseur, 620 F. Supp. 624 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Krukotf v. State, 702 P.2d 
664, 666 n.2 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); Douglas-Bey v. United States, 490 A.2d 1137, 1139 
(D.C. 1985); State v. Butler, 676 S.W.2d 809 (Mo. 1984); State v. Miller, 300 Or. 203, 709 
P.2d 225 ( 1985). 
121. See, e.g., United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1986); State v. Butler, 
676 S.W.2d 809, 813 (Mo. 1984). See also United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 
1985) (noting the significance of the "no worse off" principle to the Williams II Court's ap-
proach to inevitable discovery, yet warning that application of such a principle may cause 
irreparable damage to the exclusionary rule). /d. at 1203. See generally, United States v. 
Whitehorn, No. 86-5524 Slip op. at __ (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Merriweather, 777 
F.2d 503, 506 (9th Cir. 1985): Krukotf v. State, 702 P.2d 664, 666 n.2 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1985). 
122. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 ( 1984). In McDonald, the Court 
stated: 
We are not dealing with formalities. The presence of a search warrant 
serves a high function. Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment 
has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police. This was done 
not to shield criminals nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal activities. It 
was done so that an objective mind might weight the need to invade that privacy 
in order to enforce the law. The right of privacy was deemed too precious to 
entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the 
arrest of criminals. Power is a heady thing; and history shows that the police 
acting on their own cannot be trusted. And so the Constitution requires a magis-
trate to pass on the desires of the police before they violate the privacy of the 
home. 
/d. at 455-56. See also J. HALL, SEARCH & SEIZURE 178-80 (1982). 
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government is permitted to intrude into those areas protected by the 
fourth amendment. Post hoc judicial determinations of probable 
cause in situations where warrants are clearly required, result in an 
abandonment of the magistrate's role as a buffer between the state 
and its citizens.123 Applying the inevitable discovery doctrine to war-
rant avoidance situations would, as a matter of course, permit the 
police to enter, search, and seize based on probable cause alone since 
they can demonstrate later that a warrant could have been obtained. 
There would be no reason for the police to engage in what is widely 
perceived as the burdensome requirement of obtaining a warrant.124 
Under such an approach, if there is not sufficient evidence to 
constitute probable cause, no warrant would have been issued and 
nothing is lost. If there is probable cause, police can act without a 
warrant and come back later and show that had they taken the time 
and the effort to obtain a warrant, the evidence would similarly have 
been discovered. Segura makes this post hoc determination easier by 
rejecting the defendant's claim that the evidence might have 
changed in form or been relocated in the time it would have taken 
the police to obtain a warrant. 125 A literal reading of Williams II, 
especially with regard to its concern for insuring that the police be 
left in a position no worse off than they would have been absent their 
illegality, would seem to compel the admission of such evidence. 
Because Williams II does not deal directly with a warrant situa-
tion, the door is open to interpret the inevitable discovery doctrine in 
a way that does not have this detrimental impact on the warrant 
requirement of the fourth amendment. For example, courts could re-
quire for application of the doctrine that some effort to obtain the 
warrant be under way at the time the police illegally entered the 
house in question and seized the evidence. Such a limitation of the 
doctrine would be consistent with the factual situations in Williams 
II, where the search for the girl's body was underway at the time 
123. United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846 (lith Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Alvarez- Porras, 643 F.2d 54, 63-64 (2d Cir. 1981 ); United States v. Griffin, 502 F.2d 959, 961 
(6th Cir. 1974); People v. Schoondermark, 717 P.2d 504, 506 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985); Com-
monwealth v. Benoit, 382 Mass. 210, 415 N.E.2d 818, 823 (1981); State v. Johnson, 301 
N.W.2d 625, 629 (N.D. 1981); LaCount & Girese, supra note 21, at 506; Note, supra note 
71, at 1054. 
124. See. e.g., R. VAN DUIZERD. H. SuLLON & C. CARLER. THE SEARCH WARRANT 
PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES, (National Center for State Courts, 
1984) (concluding that "the plain fact of the matter is that many police officers perceive the 
warrant requirement as inhibiting the effective performance of their duty"). /d. at 77; J. SKOL-
NICK. JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL, 228 (2d ed. 1966). 
125. Segura v. New York, 468 U.S. at 801-02. 
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Detective Learning illegally learned of its whereabouts/ 26 and in 
Segura, where certain officers had instituted attempts to obtain a 
warrant when their colleagues entered Segura's apartment. 127 Some 
courts and commentators have adopted this approach to the doctrine 
of inevitable discovery; they maintain that the doctrine should be ap-
plied only where there is already in existence at the time of the ille-
gal discovery of evidence a demonstrable process at work which 
would likely have produced the same evidence. 128 
Others, including the attorney who represented the state of 
Iowa in Williams II, have suggested that in order for the doctrine of 
inevitable discovery to be applied without the additional requirement 
of looking to the intent of the police, the government should have to 
show that the hypothetical legal discovery of the evidence would 
have occurred through an investigation entirely independent of the 
illegal discovery. 129 Thus, where there is a race to the evidence be-
tween an investigation involving illegal police methods and an inde-
pendent legal search, the fact that the illegal actions actually led to 
the discovery of the evidence would not result in its suppression if it 
can be shown that the lawful investigation would likely have uncov-
ered the evidence eventually. 130 Again, application of this limited 
form of the inevitable discovery doctrine would be consistent with 
the result in Williams II since the systematic search that the Court 
concluded would have eventually led to the body of Pamela Powers 
126. Williams II. 467 U.S. at 448-49. 
127. Segura, 468 U.S. at 801-02. 
128. See. e.g .• United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1985). In Cherry, the 
Court said: 
[ w) hen the police have not been in active pursuit of an alternative line of 
investigation that is at a minimum supportable by leads, the general application 
of the inevitable discovery exception would greatly encourage the police to en-
gage in illegal conduct because (I) the police would usually be less certain that 
the discovery of the evidence is 'inevitable' in the absence of illegal conduct and 
(2) the danger that the evidence illegally obtained may be inadmissible would be 
reduced. 
/d. at 1204-05. See also United States v. Amuny, 767 F.2d 1128-29 (5th Cir. 1985); United 
States v. Satterfield. 743 F.2d 827, 846 (lith Cir. 1984); United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 
1037, 1042 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Levasseur, 620 F. Supp. 624, 631-32 (E.D.N.Y. 
1985); Douglas-Bey v. United States, 490 A.2d 1137, 1139 (D.C. 1985); State v. Holman, 109 
Idaho 382, 391-92, 707 P.2d 493, 502-03 ( 1985); Appel, The Inevitable Discovery Exception 
to the Exclusionary Rule, 21 CRIM. L. BULL. II 01, II, 12-13 ( 1985); Note, supra note 71, at 
I 060, I 063 and cases cited therein. Other courts have not required that an independent lawful 
investigation be in progress at the time the evidence is illegally obtained. See, e.g., Bonuchi v. 
Wyrick, No. 83-0877 slip op. at __ (W .D. Mo. Jul. 18, 1985); United States v. Silvestri, 
787 F.2d 736, 744-46 (1st Cir. 1986); State v. Miller, 300 Or. 203, 293-94, 709 P.2d 225, 242-
43 ( 1985) (specifically interpreting Williams II as not requiring that the lawful investigation 
already be in progress). 
129. Appel, supra note 128, at 110-15. 
130. /d. 
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was conducted independent of Detective Learning's interaction with 
Williams.131 
Under this theory, evidence which ultimately would have been 
discovered legally through the same process that in fact led to the 
illegal discovery of the evidence is characterized as "dependent" and 
is treated differently in examining its admissibility. In such situa-
tions, the purpose for the police offering a hypothetical independent 
source of discovery would only be to avoid suffering the conse-
quences of their illegal conduct. In fact, they then would benefit 
from their illegal conduct. Before the court is asked to cure the ille-
gality and reconstruct the investigation along hypothetical legal 
lines, this theory requires a close examination of the need for deter-
rence in such situations. Specifically, factors such as the bad faith of 
the police officer and the flagrant nature of the illegality are relevant 
in determining whether the exclusionary rule requires the suppres-
sion of evidence so discovered. 132 
Under this approach to inevitable discovery, a house search 
where probable cause was present but no warrant obtained would be 
treated in a different manner than the investigation in the Williams 
II case. Since the hypothetical legal discovery of the evidence of this 
warrant avoidance situation would be "dependent," before the inevi-
table discovery doctrine were applied in such a situation, a close ex-
amination of the officer's motivation would ensue. If a police officer 
was found to have acted deliberately to avoid the warrant require-
ment, the deterrence based exclusionary rule would presumably re-
quire suppression of the evidence. Although as previously mentioned, 
the Court's opinion in Williams II would survive such an application 
of the inevitable discovery doctrine, the Segura rationale might have 
to be changed.133 
131. /d. at 114-18. 
132. /d. See generally Note, supra note 71, at 1055-57. 
133. In Williams II the search for the girl's body was being conducted entirely indepen-
dent of Detective Learning's questioning of Williams; whereas in Segura, the illegal entry and 
continued possession of the apartment which led to the police's gaining custody of the evidence 
likely would be viewed as part of the same line of investigation that resulted in the seizure of 
the evidence pursuant to a warrant (and therefore "dependent"). See Segura 468 U.S. at 799-
802. Therefore under Appel's theory, the Williams II Court was correct in looking only to the 
likelihood of discovery, whereas the Segura Court should have assessed the motivation or bad 
faith of the officers as well before denying application of the exclusionary rule. Appel, supra 
note 128, at 122-23. 
The single reference to the "good faith" of the officers in Segura occurs in a portion of 
Chief Justice Burger's opinion, joined only by Justice O'Connor, which asserts that the original 
entry and continued possession of the apartment was justified. The reference to the apparent 
"good faith" of the officers is made to overcome an argument that the officers' remaining 
without a warrant in the apartment for 19 hours made the seizure unreasonable. Segura, 468 
340 
DOCTRINE OF INEVITABLE DISCOVERY 
Both of these aforementioned limitations on the inevitable dis-
covery doctrine maintain the key features of the doctrine while pro-
viding some check on the doctrine's probable result of reducing the 
deterrent impact of the exclusionary rule. Unfortunately, the Court's 
reasoning in Williams II seems to preclude either of these more lim-
ited approaches to the inevitable discovery doctrine. If, as the Court 
asserts, the inevitable discovery doctrine is conceptually similar to 
the independent source doctrine and the latter doctrine compels the 
police to be placed in a position no worse off than they would have 
been but for the illegality, then the only requirement for application 
of the doctrine in any circumstance would be the likelihood of dis-
covery by some form of legal means. 134 Although the existence of an 
ongoing independent legal investigation presumably increases the 
likelihood of discovery, it is by no means necessary that an investiga-
tion be either ongoing or independent for one to conclude that the 
discovery through legal means more likely than not would have oc-
curred.1311 Nothing in the Williams II opinion suggests adoption of 
this dependent/independent approach. 
Returning to the warrant avoidance situation, suppose that the 
police deliberately decide not to seek a warrant from a magistrate 
because they do not wish to undertake the task of locating the mag-
istrate or drafting an affidavit or because they do not wish to run the 
risk of being denied their warrant or granted a warrant which limits 
the search in some way. Instead, the police deliberately and know-
ingly violate the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment and 
conduct a warrantless search. At a suppression hearing held after the 
evidence is uncovered, the government is able to demonstrate that 
when the police acted, they in fact possessed the requisite probable 
cause and would most likely have been granted a warrant had one 
been sought. If the judge suppressed the evidence, the police would 
be put in a position worse off than they would have been had they 
U.S. at 813-14. No such reference is included in the portion of the majority opinion dealing 
with the "fruits of the poisonous tree"' issue. 
134. For a discussion of the "no worse off'' principle and Williams II, see infra note 
156. 
135. See supra note 128 for application of the inevitable discovery doctrine after Wil-
liams II for instances in which no lawful line of investigation is underway at the time of the 
discovery of the evidence through illegal means. At one point in the Williams II opinion, the 
Court stated that "(i]nevitable discovery involves no speculative elements but focuses on 
demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment .... "' 467 U.S. at 
444 n.5. It is not inconceivable that the Court, relying on this note, could someday require that 
in order to take advantage of the inevitable discovery doctrine, the prosecution must demon-
strate a lawful investigation already in progress. See. e.g., United States v. Lewis, 486 A.2d 
729, 735-36 (D.C. 1985)) (interpreting the above quoted footnote). 
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not proceeded illegally. Such a decision, therefore, could be seen as 
conflicting with the rationale of the Williams II opinion. Under a 
strict reading of the Wmiams II decision, such warrantless search 
situations would almost always fall within the bounds of the inevita-
ble discovery doctrine. 
In those situations in which the police are able to demonstrate 
the existence of some probable cause, they can persuasively argue 
that had they used legal methods (sought a search warrant) they 
inevitably would have discovered the evidence.136 The Court's hold-
ing in Segura, which rejects the defense argument that the evidence 
could have been moved or altered in the time it took to get a war-
rant, makes successful use of the inevitable discovery doctrine in ille-
gal warrantless search situations even more likely .137 Therefore, it is 
reasonable to conclude that an application of the inevitable discovery 
doctrine, which requires only a showing of likelihood of discovery, 
would largely remove any incentive for police officers to obtain 
warrants. 
V. Applications of the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine 
The open ended approach taken by the Supreme Court in Wil-
liams II has understandably led to non-uniform application of the 
inevitable discovery doctrine by different jurisdictions. 138 For exam-
136. See United States v. Whitehorn, No. 86-5524 slip op. at __ (4th Cir. 1987); 
United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 745-46 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. Merri-
weather, 777 F.2d 503, 505-06 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Levasseur, 620 F. Supp. 624, 
631-32 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Krukoff v. State, 702 P.2d 664, 666 n.2 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); 
State v. Butler, 676 S.W.2d 809, 813 (Mo. 1984). 
137. Segura, 468 U.S. at 814-15. 
138. United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1204 (5th Cir. 1985) (lawful investigation 
already ongoing when evidence illegally obtained); Bonuchi v. Wyrick, No. 83-0877, slip op. at 
_(W.O. Mo. Jul. 18, 1985) (doctrine applied although no lawful investigation in progress); 
United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827,846 (lith Cir. 1984) (requiring that lawful means 
of discovery were possessed and were being pursued prior to illegal obtaining of evidence); 
Douglas-Bey v. United States, 490 A.2d 1137, 1139 n.6 (D.C. 1985) (requiring commence-
ment of lawful process prior to illegal discovery of evidence); United States v. Lewis, 486 A.2d 
729, 736 (D.C. 1985) (inter;>reting Williams II as requiring a showing of "inevitability" of 
discovery different from the burden of proof by preponderance of evidence); State v. Holman, 
I 09 Idaho 382, 392, 707 P.2d 493, 502-03 ( 1985) ("narrow" application of doctrine in Wil-
liams II requiring investigation be in process); State v. Raj, 368 N.W.2d 14, 16 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1985) (relying on multifactored approach including purpose and flagrancy of misconduct; 
factors court viewed as surviving Williams II); State v. Miller, 300 Or. 203, 293-94, 709 P.2d 
225, 242-43 ( 1985) (requiring that proper procedures "would have been utilized" and inter-
preting Williams II as not requiring that the lawful investigation be underway at the time of 
the illegal discovery); State v. Washington, 120 Wis.2d 654, 358 N.W.2d 304, 310 (1984) 
(appearing to rely on "no worse off" concept in applying doctrine). 
With respect to using the doctrine to overcome the warrant requirement, some courts 
after Williams II have refused to apply the doctrine. See People v. Young, 159 Cal. App. 3d 
138, -· 205 Cal. Rptr. 402,410 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); People v. Schoondermark, 717 P.2d 
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pie, the fear expressed by some commentators, and by judges in 
some cases decided before Williams II, concerning the danger to the 
warrant requirement of an unlimited inevitable discovery doctrine139 
has already been realized. In State v. Butler, 140 after quoting at 
length from Williams II and specifically noting the significance of 
the "no worse off" principle and the absence of non-bad faith re-
quirement, the Supreme Court of Missouri allowed the prosecution 
to overcome the warrant requirement by use of this doctrine. In that 
case, the court ruled that although the police violated the defend-
ant's Miranda rights in obtaining information concerning where in 
the defendant's house evidence might be recovered and then seized 
and searched the house without a warrant, it would be appropriate to 
apply the inevitable discovery doctrine because the police could 
504, 506 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985): State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214, 235-39, 495 A.2d 90, 103-04 
( 1985l. Some courts have applied this doctrine without any restriction beyond the likelihood of 
discovery. See, e.g., United States v. Whitehorn, No. 86-5524 slip op. at __ (4th Cir. 1987); 
United States v. Moscatiello and Carter, 771 F.2d 589, 604 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 
Murray and Carter v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 1368 (1987); United States v. Merriweather, 
777 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1985): State v. Butler, 676 S.W.2d 809, 813 (Mo. 1984); State v. 
Miller, 300 Or. 203, 293-94, 709 P.2d 225, 242-43 ( 1985). Other courts have applied the 
doctrine but with additional restrictions. See United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 746 (5th 
Cir. 1986); United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1204-06 (5th Cir. 1985): United States. v. 
Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 845-47 (1985): United States v. Levasseur, 620 F. Supp. 624, 631-
32 (E.D.N.Y. 1985): Douglas-Bey v. United States, 490 A.2d 1137, 1139 n.6 (D.C. 1985). 
139. In Griffin, the Court said: 
The assertion by police (after an illegal entry and after finding evidence of 
crime) that the discovery was 'inevitable' because they planned to get a search 
warrant and had sent an officer on such a mission would, as a practical matter, 
be beyond judicial review. Any other view would tend in actual practice to emas-
culate the search warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 
United States v. Griffin, 502 F.2d 956, 961 (6th Cir. 1974). See also Commonwealth v. Be-
noit, 382 Mass. 210,415 N.E.2d 818 (1981). The Benoit court's position was: "We decline to 
apply the rule in a situation where its effect would be to read out of the Constitution the 
requirement that the police follow certain protective procedures - in this case, the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment." /d. at--· 415 N.E.2d at 823; People v. Sciacca, 
45 N.Y.2d 122, 129, 379 N.E.2d 1153, 1156, _ N.Y.S.2d -· _ (1978) stating: "The 
theory of inevitable discovery is essentially a safety valve for the exclusionary rule to be used 
when the constitutional violation is of technical dimension and should not be used to counte-
nance the breaking into a locked garage by administrative investigation." United States v. 
Allandro, 634 F.2d 1182, 1185 n.3 (9th Cir. 1980), taking the position that: "[m]echanical 
application [of independent source/inevitable discovery doctrine analysis) where a search war-
rant is subsequently commissioned ... would allow police officers to treat the warrant require-
ment as merely an ex post facto formality." United States v. Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d 54, 63-
64 (2d Cir. 1981); 3 LAFAVE, supra note 19, at 624; LaCount & Girese, supra note 21, at 506 
("[t)he unfettered use of 'inevitable discovery' would potentially void the necessity to ever 
obtain a warrant because of the presence of the argument that the investigation would have 
obtained a warrant and inevitably discovered the evidence."): Pitler, supra note 57, at 630 
("[t)he exclusionary rule, designed to discourage illegal police activity, is useless if the police 
may unlawfully invade a man's home, illegally seize evidence and then claim 'we would have 
obtained it anyway."'); Comment, supra note 67, at 158-59; Note, supra note 107, at 159; 
Note, supra note 19 at 1054. 
140. 676 S.W.2d 809 (Mo. 1984). 
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demonstrate probable cause through other means and could have ob-
tained a warrant which would have led to discovery of the evidence 
in any event. 141 
In U.S. v. Levasseur, 142 a federal district court held that the 
search of a footlocker was permissible because agents were in the 
process of preparing an affidavit which would have led to a warrant 
authorizing the search. Thus, the fact that the warrant requirement 
was avoided in this case was not deemed to be fatal. In State v. 
Miller, 143 the police learned of the whereabouts of a dead body from 
the defendant after violating his Miranda rights in a manner similar 
to the violation that occurred in Edwards v. Arizona. 1"' Unlike Wil-
liams II, the body was located in the defendant's hotel room, an area 
protected by the warrant clause of the fourth amendment. Conclud-
ing that the hotel maid would have found the body in 48 to 56 hours 
in relatively the same condition in which it was actually discovered, 
the court employed the inevitable discovery doctrine to excuse the 
officer's failure to obtain a search warrant. 145 
From the perspective of inflicting the most damage to the war-
rant requirement, the most dangerous use of the inevitable discovery 
doctrine is its application to situations in which the evidence would 
not have been discovered by legal means independent of the illegal 
warrantless entry. Suppose that possessed with probable cause, the 
police enter a house without bothering to obtain a search warrant. 
Later they argue that had they sought a warrant they would have 
obtained one and inevitably discovered the evidence in question. This 
methodology requires, in essence, a judicial reconstruction of the po-
lice investigation incorporating the necessary legal prerequisite of ob-
taining a warrant. 146 Understandably, prior to Williams II, some 
courts were most reluctant to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine 
in such a manner. 147 For example, in Commonwealth v. Benoit,148 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court refused to apply the inev-
itable discovery doctrine "where its effect would be to read out of the 
Constitution the requirement that the police followed certain protec-
141. /d. at 813. 
142. 620 F. Supp. 624, 631-32 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). 
143. 300 Or. 203, 709 P.2d 225 ( 1985). 
144. 451 u.s. 477 (1981). 
145. 300 Or. at 293-94, 709 P.2d at 242-43. 
146. Appel, supra note 128, at 115. 
147. See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 502 F.2d 959, 961 (6th Cir. 1974). See also 
United States v. Alvarez- Porras, 643 F.2d 54, 63-64 (2d Cir. 1981 ); Commonwealth v. Benoit, 
382 Mass. 210, _, 415 N.E.2d 818, 823 (1981). 
148. 382 Mass. 210, 415 N.E.2d 818 (1981). 
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tive procedures - in this case the Warrant Requirement of the 4th 
Amendment."149 'As stated previously, the "no worse off" principle 
accepted by the Supreme Court in Williams II could serve as the 
philosophical basis for just such a defacto elimination of the warrant 
requirement. 
In attempting to discern how the inevitable discovery doctrine 
will be applied by courts in the post-Williams II world, it is instruc-
tive to look at warrant avoidance situations where the evidence could 
not have been legally acquired without a search warrant. In U.S. v. 
Satterfield, uso a warrantless search of the defendant's house, subse-
quent to his arrest, turned up a gun that the prosecution wished to 
introduce into evidence. After the discovery of the gun, the police 
obtained a proper search warrant based on other information and 
claimed the gun would have been discovered during a warrant-based 
search had not the earlier warrantless search occurred.m The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit interpreted 
Williams II as being silent on the requirements for application of the 
inevitable discovery doctrine with the exception of the High Court's 
using a preponderance of evidence as its burden of proof respecting 
the likelihood of discovery .1112 Therefore, in addressing the require-
ments for application of the doctrine, the eleventh circuit fell back 
on pre- Williams II cases decided by the circuit, specifically, the deci-
sion in United States v. Brookins. 1113 Brookins required that there be 
a reasonable possibility of discovery and that the leads which suppos-
edly would have led to the legitimate discovery of the evidence must 
have been pursued prior to the illegal discovery. The Satterfield 
court asserted that suppressing evidence acquired while such legal 
procedures were in progress would put the police in a "worse off'' 
position than if no illegality had occurred and, therefore, would con-
flict with the holding in Williams 11.111• Applying these requirements 
to the search in Satterfield, the eleventh circuit refused to apply the 
inevitable discovery doctrine because the government had initiated 
its legal investigation after discovery of the evidence through illegal 
means. The court explained that: "because a valid search warrant 
nearly always can be obtained after the search has occurred, a con-
trary holding would practically destroy the requirement that a war-
149. /d. at_, 415 N.E.2d at 823. 
150. 743 F.2d 827 (II th Cir. 1984). 
151. /d. at 845. 
152. /d. at 846-47. 
153. 614 F.2d I 037 (5th Cir. 1980). 
154. 743 F.2d at 846. 
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rant for the search of a home be obtained before the search takes 
place. " 11111 
What the court in Satterfield omitted in its analysis is any ex-
planation of how the "no worse off'' concept could survive a refusal 
to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine in situations when the po-
lice have not initiated the legal process prior to the improper discov-
ery of the evidence. In this situation, but for the illegal warrantless 
search, the evidence would ultimately have been uncovered in a 
proper warrant-based search. Therefore, it would seem that by ex-
cluding the evidence the court is putting the government in a posi-
tion worse off than they would have been had the government acted 
legally. 1116 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a 
recent interpretation of Williams II, noted that applying the exclu-
sionary rule in just this type of warrant avoidance situation would in 
fact leave the police worse off than had they not acted illegally.1117 In 
refusing to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine to the seizure of a 
gun from any army barracks where the police had probable cause to 
search but never made any attempt to obtain a search warrant, the 
court refused to use the "no worse off'' principle as a sine qua non in 
deciding whether to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine: 
While suppression in such a case may put the prosecution 
in a worse position because of the police misconduct, a contrary 
result would cause The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine to swallow 
the rule by allowing evidence otherwise tainted to be admitted 
merely because the police could have chosen to act differently 
and obtain the evidence by legal means. When the police forego 
legal means of investigation simply in order to obtain evidence 
in violation of a suspect's constitutional rights, the need to deter 
is paramount and requires application of the Exclusionary 
Rule. 1&8 
There is a clear tension between a mechanical application of the 
155. /d. 
156. The facts of Williams II leave the door open to requiring that the process that 
would lead to the ultimate lawful discovery of the challenged evidence be in operation at the 
time of the illegal discovery. See generally supra note 127. However, where the police can 
demonstrate the likelihood that they would have undertaken in the future a lawful and success-
ful investigation either through direct credible statement of their intention or through the fact 
that such an investigation is their customary procedure, it would seem that suppressing such 
evidence would indeed leave them "worse off." Thus the Brookins/Satterfield requirement of 
an "investigation in progress" would seem to run counter to the thrust of the Williams II "no 
worse off' rationale. 
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"no worse off'' rule in applying the inevitable discovery doctrine and 
the deterrent impact of the exclusionary rule. 1119 The test applied by 
both the fifth and eleventh circuits would permit use of the inevitable 
discovery doctrine when police are in the process of obtaining a war-
rant at the time that an illegal warrantless entry occurred.180 Be-
cause the Supreme Court has clearly held to be irrelevant any con-
sideration of whether the police acted in bad faith, 181 it would seem 
that when one police officer decides to enter a house without waiting 
for his colleague whom he knows to be actively seeking a warrant, 
the fifth and eleventh circuits would probably allow the fruits of that 
entry into evidence. 
An examination of the cases involving police officers who 
avoided the warrant requirement in situations similar to those found 
in Satterfield and Brookins reveals the way most courts view how 
the application of the inevitable discovery doctrine will impact upon 
the deterrent role of the exclusionary rule. In United States v. Grif-
fin,162 a pre-Williams II case, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit was confronted with a situation where an officer 
entered an apartment without a search warrant after no one an-
swered the door. While they were "securing" the apartment, the po-
lice spotted illegal drugs in plain view and seized them. 163 On appeal, 
the government conceded that the initial entry was illegal but argued 
that since another agent had been dispatched to procure a warrant 
prior to the illegal entry, and since a warrant was in fact ultimately 
obtained after the illegal entry without relying on what was seen 
during the illegal entry, the evidence would have been inevitably dis-
covered legally by the post-warrant search and, therefore, should be 
admissible. 184 The sixth circuit refused to apply the inevitable discov-
ery doctrine holding that: 
The assertion by police (after an illegal entry and after 
finding evidence of a crime) that the discovery was "Inevitable" 
159. See generally People v. Young, !59 Cal. App. 3d 138, _, 205 Cal. Rptr. 402, 
410 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); People v. Schoondermark, 717 P.2d 504,506 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985); 
State v. Holman, 109 Idaho 382, 391-92, 707 P.2d 493, 502-03 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985); State 
v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214, 235-39, 495 A.2d 90, 103-04, 104 n.3 (1985); People v. Knapp, 52 
N.Y.2d 689, 698, 422 N.E.2d 531, 536, 439 N.Y.S.2d 871, 876 (1981). 
160. E.g., United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846 (lith Cir. 1984); United 
States v. Miller, 666 F.2d 991, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 
1037, 1042 n.2 (5th Cir. 1980). 
161. Williams 1/, 467 U.S. at 445. 
162. 502 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1974). 
163. /d. at 960. 
164. /d. at 960-61. This case was also decided before the Supreme Court's decision in 
Segura. See supra note 118. 
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because they had planned to get a search warrant and had sent 
an officer on such a mission, would as a practical matter be be-
yond a judicial review. Any other view would tend in actual 
practice to emasculate the search warrant requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment.160 
In U.S. v. Levasseur, 166 the Federal District Court for the East-
ern District of New York faced a somewhat similar factual situation 
to the one in Griffin. Specifically, Levasseur involved a situation in 
which an officer, already properly in a house, opened a footlocker 
while a second agent was in the progress of seeking a warrant to 
search the house. 167 The court, in this post-Williams II decision, 
adopted the standard enunciated by the fifth circuit in Satterfield 
and required that the government show that the lawful means of dis-
covery was in progress prior to the actual finding of the evidence.168 
In Levasseur, the second agent had apparently been in the pro-
cess of drafting the affidavit for the warrant when the footlocker was 
opened. The defendant argued that since the affidavit had not been 
"executed," the police had not undertaken enough of an independent 
proper investigation to trigger the inevitable discovery doctrine. The 
court held that enough proper steps had been taken to "initiate an 
avenue for obtaining the evidence," and, after finding Griffin to be 
inapplicable, it applied the inevitable discovery doctrine. 169 
Once the court determined there was a likelihood of discovery 
by legal means, the conditions of Williams II had been met, and, at 
most, once a court concludes additionally that an investigation is al-
ready in progress, any Williams-based inevitable discovery inquiry 
should end there. 170 It is, therefore, noteworthy that the Court in 
Levasseur found significance in the fact that the search of the foot-
locker had been undertaken by the police officer in good faith (as 
demonstrated by his searching only one item) although he incor-
rectly relied on the exigency exception to the warrant require-
ment.171 The finding of good faith on the part of the officer was sig-
nificant to the court because it demonstrated that the officer had 
made "no attempt to evade the warrant requirement."172 In other 
words, the court considered and apparently placed some reliance on 
165. 502 F.2d at 961. 
166. 620 F. Supp. 624 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). 
167. /d.at628-31. 
168. /d. at 631-32. 
169. /d. 
170. See supra notes 125-128, 135 and accompanying text. 
171. 620 ~ Sup~ at 632 
172. /d. 
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the absence of bad faith on the part of the officer, a factor specifi-
cally rejected by the Supreme Court in Williams II. Thus, although 
both the holding and the basis of the holding in Levasseur are differ-
ent than Griffin, the decision in Levasseur actually reflects the same 
inclination present in Griffin, but decidedly absent in Williams II, to 
look to the price in lost deterrence of applying the inevitable discov-
ery doctrine in individual cases. 173 U nsurprisingly, the Levasseur 
court found little need to deter where the officer acted in good faith. 
An understanding of how expansive the Court intends the inevi-
table discovery exception to become may soon be demonstrated when 
the Court reviews United States v. Moscatiello.U" In this case, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed a trial 
court's decision in which the inevitable discovery doctrine was used 
to overcome an improper warrantless search. 
After properly searching the defendant's truck and garage, the 
investigators in Moscatiel/o, without a warrant, entered a warehouse 
used by the defendants. There they observed burlap-wrapped bales 
that they believed to contain marijuana. The investigators then went 
to a magistrate and presented him with the information learned from 
the lawful searches of the truck and garage but not with what they 
observed during the warrantless entry of the warehouse. A search 
warrant for the warehouse was issued, and, eight hours after entry, a 
full search of the warehouse was conducted uncovering other evi-
dence of criminal activity _m 
Assuming, arguendo, that the initial entry of the warehouse was 
illegal, the first circuit considered the admissibility of both the mari-
juana observed during the entry and the evidence discovered only 
after the warrant-based search. As to the latter evidence, the court 
concluded that the Supreme Court's holding in Segura was "on all 
fours" and, therefore, this evidence was admissible under the inde-
pendent source exception.176 In considering the admissibility of the 
marijuana bales, the court turned to Williams II, "a closely analo-
gous situation." Because the only requirement for application of the 
173. Other cases in which courts have looked to the price in lost deterrence of applying 
the inevitable discovery exception without assessing the bad faith of the police include: United 
States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1205 (5th Cir. 1985); State v. Raj, 368 N.W.2d 14, 16 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985); People v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 80 Cal. App. 3d 665, 
681-82, 145 Cal. Rptr. 795, 804-05 ( 1978). In Raj, the court viewed the need to assess the 
purpose and flagrancy of the police misconduct before applying the inevitable discovery excep-
tion as surviving Williams II. 
174. 771 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1368 (1987). 
175. /d. at 595-96. 
176. /d. at 603. 
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inevitable discovery doctrine is the likelihood of discovery by lawful 
means (as Williams II seems to hold), the court held that the near 
certainty of discovering the marijuana during the warrant-based 
search compelled its admission. This holds true, the court noted, 
even though such a decision runs counter to the exclusionary rule's 
"chief and perhaps sole rationale ... to deter future violations of 
the fourth amendment."177 
The Supreme Court's response to the holding in Moscatiel/o 
should be most significant because, as the first circuit noted: "this is 
as clear a case as can be imagined where the discovery of the contra-
band in plain view is totally irrelevant to the later securing of a war-
rant and the successful search that ensued. " 178 Therefore, sup-
pressing the evidence in this case would most certainly leave the 
police in a worse position than they would have been in had not the 
illegal pre~warrant entry occurred. Thus, the Court will have to con-
front the question of whether the "no worse off'' principle as enunci-
ated in Williams II is absolute or whether concern about the price to 
be paid in the lost deterrent impact of the exclusionary rule is a 
factor to be considered when applying the inevitable discovery 
exception. 
The significance of the holding in Moscatiello may go beyond a 
determination of the breadth of the inevitable discovery doctrine and 
could signal the general approach of the Rehnquist Court to the ex-
clusion of all illegally seized evidence. Should the court affirm the 
first circuit and apply the "no worse off'' principle without limita-
tion, the vitality of the warrant clause of the fourth amendment will 
be put in serious jeopardy by the ability of police to ignore the war-
rant requirement yet avoid exclusionary rule consequences. The 
Court may choose to ameliorate this impact on the exclusionary rule 
and the warrant clause by imposing limitations on the use of the 
inevitable discovery exception in warrant avoidance situations. Such 
limitations could include a requirement that a lawful warrant ulti-
mately was obtained or that the decision not to obtain a timely war-
rant was not the result of police bad faith. However, even if such 
limitations are imposed by the Court, the requirement that the police 
obtain a warrant before entering a constitutionally protected area 
would be significantly weakened by application of the inevitable dis-
covery doctrine to warrant avoidance situations. 
177. /d. at 603-04. 
178. /d. at 604. 
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VI. Improving the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine 
The mechanical application of the inevitable discovery doctrine 
as espoused by the Supreme Court in Williams II is based on a com-
bination of faulty logic and an unpersuasive reliance upon previous 
court decisions. 179 What is particularly disturbing about such an 
open-ended, inevitable discovery doctrine is its potential, if not likely, 
effect of diminishing significantly the deterrent impact of the exclu-
sionary rule. While a tension necessarily exists between the goals of 
allowing a factfinder to consider all probative evidence and deterring 
the police from engaging in illegal conduct to obtain that evidence 
through use of the exclusionary rule, both goals can reasonably be 
accommodated through a case-by-case balancing approach to the in-
evitable discovery doctrine. The use of such a balancing approach 
would be consistent with the method the Supreme Court has repeat-
edly advocated for determining whether illegally obtained evidence 
needs to be suppressed in order to satisfy interests behind the exclu-
sionary rule. 180 
The one requirement imposed by the Court in Williams II for 
application of the inevitable discovery doctrine is that the prosecu-
tion must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
evidence in question would ultimately have been discovered through 
legal means. Williams argued that such a low burden of proof was 
inconsistent with the higher standard that the Court imposed in 
United States v. Wade. 181 The Wade court required a showing by a 
clear and convincing standard when the prosecution attempts to 
demonstrate that an in-court identification is not the product of an 
improper, uncounseled, pre-trial identification of a defendant. 182 
179. See supra notes 59·116 and accompanying text. 
180. E.g .. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (requiring a case-by-case assess-
ment of whether reliance upon warrant by officer was "objectively reasonable" and whether 
supporting affidavit was prepared in good faith before allowing evidence seized pursuant to 
invalid search warrant); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 ( 1978) (rejecting per se 
analysis for application of attenuation doctrine to testimony of live witness in favor of assessing 
intent of officer); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (requiring multifactored case-by·case 
analysis for application of attenuation exception to confession derived from illegal arrest); 
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 ( 1974) (in deciding whether Miranda holding should be 
applied precisely to evidence derived from statement taken before Miranda decision rendered, 
Court looked to good faith of police officer in assessing need to deter); Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471 ( 1963) (requiring determination of whether evidence was derived by 
"exploitation" of illegality). The Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the Brown holding. 
See also Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 ( 1982); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 ( 1980); 
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). 
181. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 444 n.5. 
182. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 240 (1967). McCormick defines "clear and 
convincing" as evidence which is "highly probable." C. McCORMICK ON EviDENCE, § 320 
( 1954). Wigmore defines "clear and convincing" as "a stronger persuasion than preponder· 
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In rejecting comparison to the identification issues involved in 
Wade, the Williams II Court noted the difficulty of determining 
whether an in-court identification stemmed from the witness' obser-
vation of the defendant at the illegal pre-trial display or instead from 
observing the defendant at the time of the crime. "By contrast, the 
inevitable discovery doctrine involves no speculative elements but fo-
cuses on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification 
or impeachment and does not require departure from the usual bur-
den of proof at suppression hearings."183 This statement by the 
Court is particularly perplexing since the inevitable discovery doc-
trine, by its very nature, calls upon a court to hypothesize or specu-
late about something that did not in fact occur! 84 Perhaps the only 
way in which to assess the Court's assertion that a decision to apply 
the inevitable discovery doctrine involves no speculation is to ex-
amine the factors relevant to determining the likelihood of discovery. 
Most courts and commentators would require for application of 
the inevitable discovery doctrine that in one form or another the 
prosecution must successfully answer two questions: 1) what specific 
lawful methods would have been used to discover the evidence and 
2) would the use of these particular methods likely have produced 
the evidence in a relatively unaltered condition? 1811 Although the fact 
that the police may have used a specific means of investigation may 
ance." J. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE (Student Textbook) § 447 at 446 ( 1935). Preponderance 
has been defined as, "proof which leads the jury to find that the existence of the contested fact 
is more probable than its non-existence." MODEL CODE OF EviDENCE Rule I, 11 5 at 71 and 
explanatory comment to~ 5 at 75 (American Law Institute 1942). While applications of these 
standards of evidence to the facts of actual cases are likely to be less than precise, it is under-
stood that the "clear and convincing" standard requires more than the "preponderance" 
standard. 
183. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 444-45 n.5. 
184. See United States v. Castellana, 488 F.2d 65, 68 (5th Cir. 1974); Parker v. Estelle, 
498 F.2d 625, 630 (5th Cir. 1974); People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 507-09, 300 N.E.2d 
139, 146-147, 346 N. Y .S.2d 793, 796-98 ( 1973) (Wachtler, J., concurring); Johnson, The 
Return of the "Christian Burial Speech" Case, 32 EMORY L.J. 349, 365, 373 (1983); Note, 
Criminal LawN. Y. Adopts the Inevitable Discovery Exception, Upholds The Validity of War-
rantless Arrests and Searches - Strikes Down The Death Penalty Statute, 23 BUFFALO L. 
REv. 275, 281 (1973-74) (requires forecasting of future); Comment, supra note 101, at 129-30 
("In practice, the [inevitable discovery] exception requires a court to assess post hoc conjecture 
by the prosecution, buttressed by police testimony as to what investigators would have done 
and would have achieved. Such avowals are easily made, yet particularly difficult to rebut 
persuasively."). 
185. See United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846 (II th Cir. 1984); United States 
v. Miller, 666 F.2d 991,996-97 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Lewis, 486 A.2d 729,735-36 
(D.C. 1985); State v. Miller, 300 Or. 203,293,709 P.2d 225,242 (1985); State v. Sugar, 100 
N.J. 214,265,495 A.2d 90, 103 (1985); Pitler, supra note 57, at 491; Note, supra note 57, at 
91-92; Comment, The Inevitable Discovery Exception in California: A Need for Clarification 
of the Exclusionary Rule, 15 U.S.F. L. REv. 283, 288-89 ( 1980-81 ); Comment, supra note 
101, at 127. 
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be a "historical fact capable of ready verification," the likelihood of 
actual discovery will only occasionally be so demonstrable and not 
subject to speculation.186 In Williams II itself, the ongoing search for 
the girl's body was clearly demonstrated, but assessing the likelihood 
of success of the search required speculation by the Court on the 
following issues: 1) whether the area in which the girl's body was 
found would have been searched; 2) whether the body would have 
been seen off the side of the road in a culvert where it was found; 3) 
whether the snow would have covered the body by the time it was 
reached; and 4) whether time would have caused the body to change 
so that certain evidence derived from it would not have been 
available.187 
When the Court imposes a relatively low burden of proof upon 
the prosecution regarding the likelihood of discovery, it comes closer 
to requiring a showing that the evidence could have been discovered 
as opposed to requiring that the evidence would have been discov-
ered.188 A showing of the former does not break the causal chain 
between the initial illegality and the ultimate discovery of the evi-
dence, 189 and use of the inevitable discovery exception in such a situ-
ation makes the Court's analogy to the independent source doctrine 
particularly suspect.190 
186. Commenting on the hypothetical nature of the inevitable discovery doctrine, one 
commentator wrote: "Judges have a great deal of leeway when they are speculating about the 
answers to hypothetical questions." Johnson, supra note 184, at 364. See generally Comment, 
supra note 101. at 129-30; 74 COLUM. L. REv., supra note 57, at 93; Pitler, supra note 57, at 
505. See also cases cited supra note 170. 
187. See Respondent's Brief at 32, Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (Williams II). 
See also Johnson, supra note 184, at 372-73 (commenting upon the likelihood of inevitable 
discovery). 
188. Maguire, How to Unpoison the Fruit - The Fourth Amendment and the Exclu-
sionary Rule, 55 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 307, 315-17 (1964); Comment, supra note 101, 
at 128 n.74. 
189. Maguire, supra note 174, at 315. Professor Maguire, in discussing the essential 
requirements of the inevitable discovery doctrine, wrote: 
The significance of the word ·•would" cannot be overemphasized. It is not 
enough to show that the evidence "might" or "could" have been otherwise ob-
tained. [To sever the causal connection between illegality and the finding of evi· 
dence) the Government must establish that it has not benefitted by the illegal 
acts; a showing it might not have so benefitted is insufficient. 
Jd. at 315. See also Pi tier, supra note 57, at 590 (danger of applying doctrine based on "might 
have" discovered); Comment, supra note 96, at 128-29 (greater quantum of evidence should 
be required where, as with inevitable discovery doctrine, application calls for speculation); 
Note, supra note 107, at 152 (the closer discovery is to certainty, the less likely the Govern· 
ment is to benefit from its illegal behavior); Johnson, supra note 84, at 365 (higher burden of 
proof may be justified "given the presumed temptation to resolve doubtful hypothetical ques-
tions in favor of admitting evidence"). 
190. In a case decided after Williams II, the Supreme Court of New Jersey rejected the 
Williams II "preponderance of the evidence" standard in favor of a "clear and convincing" 
evidence requirement. State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214, 265-66, 495 A.2d 90, 103-04 (1985). The 
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The closer the likelihood of discovering the evidence approaches 
actual "inevitability," the more the inevitable discovery exception re-
sembles the independent source rule and therefore should be applied 
in a manner similar to that of the independent source rule. Take, for 
example, a defendant who is arrested on the street, then subjected to 
an immediate interrogation which violates his Miranda rights. Dur-
ing this interrogation, he admits that he has a glassine envelope of 
heroin in his pants pocket which he then proceeds to hand to the 
police. In such a situation, the police can readily demonstrate that 
they would have properly discovered the heroin pursuant to a search 
of the defendant's pocket incident to their arrest.191 Given the near 
certainty of the ultimate discovery of the evidence through legal 
means had the illegal questioning not occurred, the inevitable discov-
ery exception should be applied in a manner similar to the indepen-
dent source doctrine without great concern for whether the police 
illegality was purposeful or flagrant. As the likelihood of discovery 
diminishes there is a correspondingly greater chance that the police 
will benefit from their illegal conduct. 192 In such situations, a variety 
of factors which impact upon the deterrent function of the exclusion-
ary rule should come into play before a determination is made that 
the inevitable discovery exception should be applied. 
Perhaps foremost among those factors are the purposefulness 
and the flagrance of the police illegality. As the Supreme Court has 
made clear on numerous occasions, it is particularly in those situa-
tions in which the police act with knowledge that their activity is 
illegal that the need to deter through suppression of evidence is most 
acute. 198 The suppression of evidence in such situations, it is hoped, 
will deter not only the officer involved in the illegality, but more im-
New Jersey court required a higher standard because it was the State that "created a situation 
in which it is impossible to be certain what would have happened if no illegal conduct had 
occurred." /d. at 103. Given this and the fact that the State is in total control of the informa-
tion needed to overcome its violation of the law through the inevitable discovery doctrine, the 
court imposed a higher burden of proof on the State regarding the likelihood of discovery. /d. 
191. Searches incident to arrest have been explicitly sanctioned by the Supreme Court. 
See, e.g., Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640,645 (1983); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 
218, 224 (1973). 
192. The reason for this is that evidence which would never have been obtainable will 
now be available for use against the defendant due entirely to the commission of an illegal act 
by the government. 
193. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 
U.S. 268, 279-80 ( 1978); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 485-89 n. 35 ( 1976); Brown v. 
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 611 ( 1975) (Powell, J., concurring). Commenting upon the purposeful-
ness and Aagrance factors, one observer wrote "(w]here the officer recognizes that a search is 
clearly illegal, the special deterrence effect should not be diluted, since the officer also should 
recognize that the fruit of the search will be excluded .... "Israel, supra note 107, at 1413-
14. 
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portantly, other officers who in the future would contemplate acting 
in a similarly illegal manner. 194 The Court has described this for-
ward-looking approach to the exclusionary rule by stating: "The 
[Exclusionary] Rule is calculated to prevent not to repair. Its pur-
pose is to deter . . . to compel respect for the constitutional guaran-
tee in the only effectively available way ... by removing the incen-
tive to disregard it. " 1911 
Errors of constitutional magnitude that are committed by police 
officers who are aware of the illegal nature of their action (bad faith) 
are the more appropriate targets for application of the exclusionary 
rule for two reasons. The first of these reasons involves the need to 
deter, and the second concerns the effectiveness of the exclusionary 
rule as a deterrent. 
There has for some time been debate about whether future un-
intentional police mistakes can be deterred through the use of the 
exclusionary rule. 198 Proponents of a good faith exception to applica-
tion of the rule argue that one cannot deter someone from acting in 
a manner which he is unaware is wrong at the time the action is 
taken. 197 Opponents of a good faith exception respond that even an 
objective good faith test puts a premium on ignorance and communi-
cates the wrong message to police departments concerning how they 
should train their new officers. 198 Regardless, it is seldom disputed 
194. See. e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,492 (1976); See also Note, supra note 71, 
at 1148-51; Amsterdam, Perspectives on the 4th Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 435 
(1974); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search & Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665, 
710-12 (1970). 
195. 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). Professor Amsterdam has compared the deterrent pur-
pose of the exclusionary rule with the aim of putting an identification number on a television 
set. Excluding evidence will not necessarily put fear in the mind of the officer contemplating an 
illegal action any more than seeing an identification number will frighten a potential thief. The 
value of the television and its attractiveness to the thief, however, will be diminished by the 
identification number in much the same way it is hoped the value of evidence illegally obtained 
will be reduced by the threat of the exclusionary rule. Amsterdam, supra note 194, at 43 I. 
196. See infra notes 197-98. 
197. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 246 
(1983) (White, J., concurring); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 536 (1976) (White, J., dissent-
ing); United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980); FRIENDl v. BENCHMARKS, 260-
62 (1967); Israel, supra note 107, at 1413-14; see generally Wright, Must the Criminal Go 
Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEX. L. REv. 736 ( 1971-72); Comment, Is It Time For a 
Change in the Exclusionary Rule?, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 161, 177 ( 1982). 
198. See generally LaFave, "The Seductive Call of Expediency": U.S. v. Leon, Its Ra-
tionale and Ramifications, 1984 U. Ill. L. F. 895 (1984); Kamisar, Gates. "Probable Cause," 
"Good Faith" and Beyond, 69 IowA L. REv. 551 (1984); Beadley, "The Good Faith Excep-
tion" Cases: Reasonable Exercises in Futility, 60 IND. L.J. 287 ( 1984-85); Bloom, U.S. v. 
Leon and Its Ramifications, 56 U. Cow. L. REv. 247 ( 1985). Additionally, some commenta-
tors have argued that a "good faith" exception would stiHe the development of Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence. See Mertens and Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclu-
sionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365, 371 ( 1981 ); 
Comment, Leading Cases of the 1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REv. 87, 117 ( 1984-85). 
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that if the exclusionary rule does deter, it works best in discouraging 
police officers who may be contemplating committing an act which 
they know or believe to be illegal and, therefore, know they are risk-
ing suppression of the evidence if they so proceed. Therefore, the 
effectiveness of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent is likely to be far 
greater when the police illegality involved is both knowing and 
deliberate. 199 
Furthermore, the need to deter is greater when the illegal activ-
ity of the police is deliberate. Society needs to make clear to the 
enforcers of our laws that when they deliberately violate constitu-
tional principles a penalty must be paid.20° Constitutional violations 
committed by police officers are far more harmful to society when 
done deliberately because such errors are in fact more egregious and 
because they are perceived by society to be more egregious. The long 
term success of our criminal justice system depends in no small part 
upon the perception of that system. 
In according no relevance to the bad faith of a police officer in 
determining whether the inevitable discovery doctrine should be ap-
plied, the Supreme Court in Williams II rejected the approach taken 
by both the Iowa Supreme Court201 which affirmed Williams' convic-
tion and the eighth circuit which reversed it,202 as well as numerous 
other courts and commentators. 203 The Court's failure to consider 
the bad faith of the officer is particularly disturbing when coupled 
with its requirement that the prosecution need only show the evi-
199. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984): United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 
268, 279-80 (1978): United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458-59 n. 35 (1976): Brown v. 
lllinois, 422 U.S. 590, 611 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring): United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 
531, 537-39 (1975): United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343, 351-52 (1974): Pitler, 
supra note 57, at 597: Note, supra note 57, at 99-100. 
200. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 590, 611 ( 1975) (Powell, J., concurring): Note, supra 
note 57, at 597; Israel, supra note I 07, at 1413-14: Note, supra note 71, at 1138. With respect 
specifically to the relationship between the need to deter intentional police misconduct and the 
application of the inevitable discovery doctrine, see United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 
1204: United States v. Alvarez- Porras, 643 F.2d 54, 65 (2d Cir. 1981 ): People v. Sciacca, 45 
N.Y.2d 122, 128-29, 379 N.E.2d 1153, 1156 (1978): Comment, supra note 67, at 142-43; 
Note, supra note 57, at 99-100. 
201. See State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 258-60 (Iowa 1979). 
202. See Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164, 1169-72 (8th Cir. 1983). 
203. See United States v. Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d 54, 64-65 (2nd Cir. 1981 ): United 
States v. Allard, 634 F.2d 1182, 1185-86 (9th Cir. 1980): United States v. Carsello, 578 F.2d 
199, 204 (7th Cir. 1978): United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577, 584-85 (Ind. Cir. 1970). 
See also People v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 80 Cal. App.3d 665, 680-83, 145 Cal. 
Rptr. 795, 805 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978): People v. Sciacca, 45 N.Y.2d 122, 128-29, 379 N.E.2d 
1153, 1156, 408 N.Y.S.2d 22, 25-26 (1978): 3 LAFAVE, supra note 19, at 624; Comment, 
supra note 65, at 160: Comment, supra note 171, at 303; Note, supra note 56, at I 00; Note, 
supra note 101, at 159; Note, supra note 69, at 1148-49. See generally Comment, supra note 
78 at 768-69. 
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dence more likely than not would have been discovered. The combi-
nation of these two factors permits a police officer to deliberately and 
flagrantly violate a constitutional requirement secure in the knowl-
edge that he need only show that there is a slightly better than even 
chance that the evidence would ultimately have been discovered 
through legal means had he chosen to use them. In such a situation, 
both the need to deter and the likelihood of actually achieving deter-
rence in the future through suppression of the evidence is at its 
greatest. 
Another factor largely ignored by both the majority and the dis-
senting opinions in Williams II is the nature of the right violated.204 
Only the concurring opinion of Justice Stevens examines in depth the 
significance of Detective Learning's violation of William's right to 
counsel under the sixth amendment. Justice Stevens concludes that 
the use of the "Christian Burial Speech" "was nothing less than an 
attempt to substitute an ex parte, inquisitorial process for the clash 
of adversaries commanded by the constitution. "206 The evil of such a 
process is that it is completely inconsistent with the notion of what is 
required for a fair trial. However, if the trial process is not tainted 
by the Williams statement or any information which flowed from it, 
the trial process has not been interfered with, and no suppression 
need result from the sixth amendment violation. As the prosecution 
must show that the evidence likely would have been uncovered even 
without the illegally obtained statement, the trial process, according 
to Justice Stevens, will not be tainted by admitting evidence derived 
from the Powers girl's body.206 With no taint in the adversary pro-
cess, there is no sixth amendment violation and no need to suppress. 
Justice Stevens asserts further that since the process has not been 
affected there is no need to assess whether Detective Learning acted 
in bad faith once it is determined that discovery of the body would 
likely have ensued in any event. 207 
Justice Stevens' criticism of the majority for ignoring the nature 
of the right violated before applying the inevitable discovery doctrine 
is warranted. The Supreme Court has recently made clear that 
courts should try to establish a test for determining whether a consti-
204. The majority opinion deals with the nature of the sixth amendment right violated 
only in response to the defendant's claim that a violation of the sixth amendment should not 
require a balancing of competing values before suppressing evidence. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 
446-47. The dissent does not discuss the nature of the right violated at all. Jd. at 458 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). 
205. /d. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
206. /d. at 456-57 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
207. /d. at 457 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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tutional violation has occurred and, if so, tailor a remedy both to the 
wrong committed and protection of the interests that lie behind mak-
ing the conduct unlawful. 208 Accordingly, when police having proba-
ble cause but no search warrant search a house and seize evidence 
therefrom, it is wrong to limit consideration of whether the inevita-
ble discovery doctrine should be applied to just the likelihood of dis-
covery had a warrant in fact been obtained. A court considering in-
evitable discovery application in such a situation should place great 
weight upon the purpose of the warrant clause of the fourth amend-
ment and the reason for excluding evidence obtained in violation of 
this constitutional principle.209 The Constitution requires that a war-
rant be obtained so that a magistrate, independent of the police, is 
interposed between the individual and the forces of Jaw enforce-
ment. 210 It is this independent magistrate who, absent exceptional 
circumstances, must make the determination of probable cause 
before the police intrude upon fundamental privacy interests. Admit-
ting evidence because of the fact that it likely would have been dis-
covered had the police taken the time to comply with the warrant 
clause strikes directly at the purposes behind the warrant require-
ment.211 In order to deter the police from routinely avoiding the war-
208. In United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 ( 1981 ), the Court declared that a dis-
missal of the case was not an appropriate remedy for an alleged sixth amendment violation 
stemming from attempts by DEA officials to get the defendant to change counsel. /d. at 363. 
The approach advocated by the Court in Morrison was to "identify and then neutralize the 
taint by tailoring relief appropriate to the circumstances to assure the defendant the effective 
assistance of counsel and a fair trial." /d. at 365. 
209. The Court itself has recently placed great weight upon these factors when it de-
cided that evidence obtained pursuant to an invalid search warrant should be admissible if 
seized by an o!licer acting in reasonable good faith. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 
( 1984). Further, the Court considered the factors when it abandoned the "Aguillar-Spinelli 
test" for determining what constitutes probable cause and required appellate courts reviewing 
the su!liciency of affidavits to give "great deference" to the issuing magistrate's determination. 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1984). 
210. 12 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 151 (2d ed. 1978); RINGEL, SEARCH & 
SEIZURE, p. 5-2 ( 1980). The Supreme Court has written: 
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous 
officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences 
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring 
that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of 
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferret-
ing out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's 
disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in 
making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity 
and leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers. 
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (footnotes omitted). See also United 
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 ( ). 
211. United States v. Griffin, 502 F.2d 959, 961 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Sat-
terfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846 (lith Cir. 1984); People v. Young, 159 Cal. App. 3d 138, __ , 
205 Cal. Rptr. 402, 410 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); People v. Knapp, 422 N.E.2d 531, 536, 52 
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rant requirement (especially given the relative ease of demonstrating 
the likelihood of both obtaining a warrant when probable cause ex-
ists and finding the evidence in the same condition),212 the inevitable 
discovery exception should not be applied to such warrant avoidance 
situations. 
Even though Justice Stevens appropriately looks to the nature of 
the right to counsel as defined in Massiah and later cases,213 he is 
wrong to conclude that such an examination automatically requires 
application of the inevitable discovery exception in Williams II once 
the prosecution demonstrates it was more likely than not that the 
body would have been discovered absent the illegality. In addition to 
examining the nature of the right involved, Justice Stevens should 
have additionally required examination of how application of the in-
evitable discovery doctrine might weaken the deterrent impact of the 
exclusionary rule and, therefore, encourage violations of the right to 
counsel.214 Justice Stevens acknowledged that the inevitable discov-
ery doctrine must not be applied in such a manner but found that 
the burden on the prosecution to demonstrate the likelihood of dis-
covery would remove such an incentive by forcing the police to face 
the risk of suppression.2111 
As previously stated, the risk of suppression in many instances 
may well be worth taking on the part of the police216 and, if it is, the 
disincentive to violate the right to counsel is largely removed. More-
over, once it was conceded by Justice Stevens that it is necessary to 
examine the police incentive to violate the constitutional principle in 
question,217 the intent of the officer who violates the law would seem 
to be a highly material consideration. That a police officer knows his 
actions to be violative of the right to counsel and still chooses to act 
in order to uncover evidence suggests there is a real need to insure 
that similar violations of this fundamental right by police in the fu-
ture be avoided. Since the purpose of the right to counsel, unlike the 
N.Y.2d 689, 698, 439 N.Y.S.2d 871, 876 (1981); State v. Johnson, 301 N.W.2d 625, 629 
(N.D. 1981); Commonwealth v. Benoit, 382 Mass. 210, 238, 415 N.E.2d 818, 823 (1981); 
United States v. Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1981). 
212. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text. 
213. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430 
u.s. 387 (1977). 
214. In United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1047 (5th Cir. 1980), the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit declared that the primary purpose of the exclu-
sionary rule in sixth amendment cases was to deter the police from infringing upon the right to 
counsel. 
215. 467 U.S. at 456-57 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
216. See supra notes 99-114 and accompanying text. 
217. 467 U.S. at 456 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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warrant requirement, is to protect the fairness of the trial, if the 
state can demonstrate the near certainty of discovering the evidence 
eventually through lawful means, the evidence should be admissible. 
However, admitting evidence based upon a showing of a mere likeli-
hood of eventual discovery when the evidence actually is discovered 
through a deliberate violation of the right to counsel does not ade-
quately protect so fundamental a right from future encroachment. 
VII. Conclusion 
The doctrine of inevitable discovery can play a constructive role 
in ameliorating the sometimes unduly harsh impact of the exclusion-
ary rule. In applying the doctrine, however, care should be taken to 
ensure that important constitutional rights protected by the exclu-
sionary rule are not diluted. The approach taken by the Supreme 
Court in Williams II regarding the inevitable discovery doctrine is 
likely to result in just such a dilution. 
By expressly permitting the government to use the doctrine to 
overcome police illegalities committed deliberately and flagrantly, 
the Court does real damage to important constitutional principles 
such as the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment and the 
exclusionary rule as a a means of protecting those principles. In se-
lecting the lowest conceivable burden of proof for a factual determi-
nation that is necessarily hypothetical and frequently speculative in 
nature, the Court facilitates the process whereby these principles are 
weakened. 
The doctrine of inevitable discovery can largely achieve the pur-
pose envisioned by its proponents without paying such a heavy price 
in lost constitutional protections. Before applying the doctrine, courts 
should consider the nature of the right violated; the purposes behind 
application of the exclusionary rule in the context of that right, and 
the likelihood of actual discovery through a subsequent lawful 
means. 
As the degree of likelihood of discovery by subsequent lawful 
means increases toward near certainty, the closer the case is to one 
where an application of the independent source rule would be appro-
priate. In such cases, as with those applying the independent source 
rule, the exclusionary rule approaches "inapplicability," and, there-
fore, such cases warrant little consideration of exclusionary rule con-
cerns, namely, the bad faith of the police. As the degree of likelihood 
of discovery by lawful means diminishes toward the "preponder-
ance" level, the exclusionary rule is more clearly applicable, and ap-
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plication of the inevitable discovery doctrine is more aptly described 
as an overcoming or satisfaction of the rule. In such situations, as 
with the application of the attenuation doctrine, those factors that 
impact upon the purposes behind the exclusionary rule need to be 
considered. As the primary purpose of the rule is to deter police mis-
conduct, an assessment of the purposefulness and flagrance of the 
police action is most relevant when the likelihood of lawful discovery 
is not overwhelming. 
Additionally, when the very purpose of the constitutional right 
violated would be defeated by application of the doctrine of inevita-
ble discovery, even the near certainty of subsequent discovery should 
not result in the admissibility of the challenged evidence. Such a 
right is contained in the warrant clause of the fourth amendment. 
Use of the inevitable discovery doctrine to overcome searches of con-
stitutionally protected areas undertaken without search warrants 
would undermine the constitutionally-mandated procedure of ob-
taining a warrant before such searches take place. By incorporating 
these considerations into a determination whether to apply the inevi-
table discovery doctrine, the Supreme Court can properly balance 
the competing interests of admitting probative evidence while not di-
luting our most important constitutional protections. 
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